FOREWORD

The World Trade Report is a new annual publication produced by the WTO Secretariat. Each year, the WTR will explore trends in world trade and highlight important issues in the world trading system. In addition to monitoring and interpreting trade developments, the Report seeks to deepen public understanding of pressing policy issues. The WTR does not pretend to provide comprehensive answers to complex and many-sided questions subject to continuing debate among governments and their constituencies. Rather, by explaining the origin of issues and offering an analytical framework within which to address them, the WTR aims to contribute to more informed discussion and a better appreciation of the options available to address policy challenges.

Following a report on trends in world trade over the previous year and some observations about prospects for the current year, WTR 2003 takes up three issues of topical interest in international trade. These are developments in South-South trade, trends in non-oil commodity markets, and the growth of regional trade agreements. In each case the Report analyses developments over the last few years, highlights their implications, and draws a number of conclusions about the options facing governments.

In the case of South-South trade, we see a marked expansionary trend, but one that is rather narrowly based in regional terms. South-South trade clearly holds dynamic potential that could be realized more effectively through further trade liberalization. This conclusion should in no way dilute focus on the need for continuing liberalization efforts in respect of North-South trade, nor should it understate the need to develop the necessary infrastructure and policy climate to facilitate South-South trade.

The Report's analysis of trends in non-oil commodity markets highlights the well-known fact that developing countries economically reliant on basic commodities have suffered in recent years from price declines and continuing volatility. A range of solutions are on offer to address this problem, but some of them have proven less than effective in the past. Fresh thinking is needed, both on the question of what can be done in respect of the commodity markets themselves, and how developing countries might diversify their economies away from excessive reliance on a narrow production base. Trade liberalization has a role to play, particularly in the areas of agriculture and tariff escalation.

Regional trade agreements have burgeoned in the last decade or so. This can be good news and bad news. Such agreements are good news when they bring regions closer together, create new profitable trading opportunities and set the scene for more inclusive market-opening. They are bad news when they discriminate unduly against third parties and frustrate the attainment of multilateral objectives built on non-discrimination. No government has challenged the view that the multilateral trading system must retain its primary unifying role at the core of trade relations among nations. Given this unity of purpose, governments need to do more to ensure the coherence and compatibility of regional trading arrangements with the multilateral trading system. This implies a strong commitment to advancing the multilateral agenda as well as ensuring that regional agreements are designed to support and not to compete with the WTO system.

The second section of the WTR addresses a broad range of issues that are of immediate and vital interest to the membership of the WTO. This year's theme is trade and development. Starting from a broad although brief discussion of development and the relationship between trade and development, the Report goes on to analyse how the Doha Development Agenda can contribute to growth and development in developing countries.

The Director-General of the WTO would never declare any year unimportant or unchallenging for the trading system. But some years are undoubtedly more momentous than others, and this is one of them. The Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September is not the end of the Doha negotiations, but a very important landmark on the road to completion. At Cancún, Ministers will have to take stock of progress in the negotiations, provide political guidance and take certain decisions. This is not simply about meeting targets and completing an agenda – it is about creating conditions for advancement in all countries, and in particular about expanding opportunities for developing countries through their more effective inclusion in the trading system.

Focusing particularly on this last point, the Report examines how the Doha negotiations and work programme can contribute to more effective and intensified engagement by developing countries in the WTO, building on new opportunities generated by policy change in both developed and developing countries. The Report divides its analysis into segments dealing with market access questions, policies aimed at facilitating openness for development, policies for managing openness within the WTO rules, and issues relating to the possible expansion of the WTO's negotiating agenda. In each instance, the Report identifies basic issues and assesses options in terms of their implications for development.

I shall allow the Report to speak for itself. But I wish to make two key points. First, strong and renewed political commitment is required if we are to give effect to the promise of Doha. Success in moving forward effectively on the Doha Agenda will generate new economic opportunities, boost business confidence, and send an important political message of support for multilateral cooperation aimed at restoring health and stability to the world economy. Failure to advance will deny us all these things and dent credibility.

Second, as governments formulate their positions in respect of the many issues on the Doha Agenda requiring decision, an important point to keep in mind is that the effective pursuit of national interests requires joint action around shared objectives. That means joint responsibility for an effective process of give and take. Countries hardly ever obtain everything they want in negotiations, but it is deeply fallacious to see an outcome yielding no result as a better option than one that might require hard work and patience, but offers something to all parties.

Supachai Panitchpakdi

Director-General

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DISCLAIMER

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ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AMS	Aggregate Measurement of Support
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AVE	*Ad valorem* equivalent
CACM	Central American Common Market
CARICOM	Caribbean Common Market
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CEECs	Central Eastern European Countries
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEMAC (UDEAC)	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale))
CEP	Closer Economic Partnership
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariffs
CGE	Computable General Equilibrium
CGs	Consultative Groups
CIS	The Commonwealth of Independant States
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CTE	Committee on Trade and Environment
DSB	Dispute Settlement Body
DSU	Dispute Settlement Understanding
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZs	Exclusive Economic Zones
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EKC	Environmental Kuznets Curve
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HIPC	Highly-indebted Poor Countries
HS	Harmonised System of tariff classification
ICO	International Coffee Organization
IDB	Integrated Database
IF	Integrated Framework
IFSC	Integrated Framework Steering Committee
IFWG	Integrated Framework Working Group
IICs	Inter-Institutional Committees
IMF	International Monetary Fund

ITC	International Trade Centre
IUU	illegal, unreported and unregulated
JITAP	Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme
kcal	kilo calorie
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEAs	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MFA	Multifibre Arrangement
MFN	Most-Favoured Nation
MTN	Multilateral trade negotiation categories
MTS	Multilateral Trading System
MUV	Manufacturing Unit Values
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NICs	Newly Industrialized Countries
NPR-PPMs	Non product-related processes and production methods
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
R&D	Research and Development
RMP	Ratio of Margin of Preference
RTA	Regional Trade Agreements
S&D	Special and Differential Treatment
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	South African Development Community
SCM	Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
TFP	Total Factor Productivity
TPR	Trade Policy Review
TRIPS	Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Department
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
UEMOA	Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine

The following symbols are used in this publication:

c.i.f.	cost, insurance and freight
f.o.b.	free on board
...	not available
0	figure is zero or became zero due to rounding
-	not applicable
$	United States dollars
Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4	1st quarter, 2nd quarter, 3rd quarter, 4th quarter
I	break in comparability of data series. Data after the symbol do not form a consistent series with those from earlier years

Billion means one thousand million.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. DEVELOPMENTS AND SELECTED ISSUES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM

At the Fourth World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting held in Doha in November 2001, Ministers launched a comprehensive set of multilateral trade negotiations and a work programme. This mandate is sometimes referred to as the Doha Development Agenda, reflecting a shared desire to ensure that the trading system is relevant and responsive to the needs of developing countries. Among the areas covered by the negotiations or the work programme are market access in manufactures, agriculture and services, certain rules (including anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, and regional arrangements), trade and environment, trade-related intellectual property rights, the relationship between trade and investment, the interaction between trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, and dispute settlement. Developing countries were particularly instrumental in putting certain issues on the agenda, including trade and technology transfer, trade, debt and finance, small economies, implementation issues (mostly pending from the Uruguay Round) and special and differential treatment. Views continue to differ on how and in some cases whether to include all the issues mentioned above in the negotiations, which are due for completion at the end of 2004.

The World Trade Report 2003 contains two chapters. The first covers developments in the trading system such as changes in the structure, value and volume of international trade in goods and services. It also includes an analysis of two aspects of trade and one trade policy issue – South-South trade, commodity trade and regional trading agreements. Chapter II examines the link between trade and development and discusses opportunities offered by the Doha Development Agenda for Members to benefit more from trade and improved trading rules. It lays out briefly a conceptual framework that argues countries can increase the benefits of openness through international co-operation. Such co-operation allows countries to benefit from the liberalization of others as well as their own. Multilateral trade negotiations can play a valuable role in coordinating liberalization among countries and establishing rules of the trading system that are conducive to development. The second Section of Chapter II examines the challenges and opportunities for improving the prospects of developing countries through the negotiations and work programme of the Doha Development Agenda.

World trade did better in 2002 than 2001...

Trade in 2002 recovered from the decline of the previous year, growing at about 2.5 per cent in volume terms, which was faster than the growth of global output. Commercial services trade expanded by 5 per cent in value terms, despite the lingering fear of terrorism and higher fuel prices, both of which limited growth in international travel and transportation services. The rebound occurred under some difficult conditions: the weakness of the global economic recovery, greatly reduced capital (foreign direct investment) flows, major changes in exchange rates, increased restrictions on international trade transactions to mitigate risks from terrorism, and failings in corporate governance. Overall, the last two years have been a period of significant weakness in the global economy, departing from the last decade's unprecedented growth in global trade and capital flows.

... although there were significant differences in trade performance among regions and countries.

The global economic recovery proved uneven, with significant differences in growth performance across regions. The driving forces of the pick-up in global economic activity were the United States, the advanced economies in East Asia, China and the transition economies. In contrast, Western Europe and Japan experienced stagnation or a decline in domestic demand. In Latin America, crises in Argentina and Venezuela contributed to the severe slump. Trade performance largely mirrored the pattern of economic growth. It was strong in developing Asia and the transition economies. North America's imports recovered in line with stronger domestic demand, although exports decreased in 2002. Trade remained stagnant in Western Europe and imports contracted in Latin America as a result of economic turmoil in a number of countries in the region.

Despite recent shocks to the international economy, trade growth for 2003 may be a little better than in 2002 and about equal to the growth of global output.

Considerable uncertainty clouds trade volume growth prospects for 2003, estimated at less than 3 per cent. The downside risks on predictions for 2003 relate to continued sluggishness in the world economy, economic and political instability in the Middle East and the unexpected impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia.

Noteworthy features of the trading system to emerge in the last few years include the growth in the share of South-South trade in world trade,....

Between 1990 and 2001, South-South trade grew faster than world trade with the share of intra-developing country trade in world merchandise exports rising from 6.5 per cent to 10.6 per cent. Over this period, developing country economies grew much faster than those of the developed and transition countries. The liberalization of the trade and investment regimes of a large number of these countries has played a significant role in this expansion.

Much of this expansion in South-South trade took place in developing Asia (which accounts for more than two-thirds of intra-developing country trade). Manufactures, in particular office and telecom equipment, played a leading role in the growth of intra-developing country trade. This strong performance can be attributed in part to open trade and investment policies in the major developing economies of Asia. Trade liberalization in Asia took various forms in the 1990s: some of it was undertaken on a unilateral basis, some arose from multilateral efforts.

Despite the successes of a number of developing countries over the last decade, impediments still exist to prevent a further deepening of South-South trade. These include high levels of tariff protection, in particular on products such as automobiles and clothing, and in agriculture. The Doha negotiations on agriculture and non-agricultural tariffs could be an important source of efficiency gains for developing countries, an impetus for growth, and a means for increased trade among both developed and developing countries.

... the decline and continued volatility of commodity prices, ...

Declining and volatile commodity prices and their impact on the development prospects of poor countries have been a recurring issue in international trade. Many commodity prices have experienced pronounced declines in the course of the last decade, resulting in reduced export revenues. Evidence suggests that commodity price shocks retard growth rates and threaten persistent or rising poverty in already poor countries.

The explanation for the long-run behaviour of prices has traditionally focused on differences in demand elasticities for manufactures and commodities, as well as market power enjoyed by developed countries in manufactured goods. However, there are alternative explanations based on technical progress and secular improvements in agricultural productivity. In the short to medium term, other factors such as trade policies (particularly agricultural subsidies and tariff escalation) in developed countries, the structure of the international market for commodities, and global macroeconomic conditions also play a part.

In the past, many governments sought to manage terms of trade shocks through control of the marketing or supply of primary commodities. However, the experience of marketing boards in developing countries has been far from salutary. International commodity agreements have not fared very well either. An important part of the challenge is for developing countries to diversify away from primary exports. Considering the historical experience of the limitations of import substitution policies in fostering sustained income and export growth, attention has focused increasingly on fostering openness to trade and foreign direct investment, and on building human capital, infrastructure and sound institutions. Many of these changes take time; in the short to medium term, continuing reform in agricultural trade and greater reliance on markets would be beneficial to commodity exporters. By dealing with some of the underlying policy-related causes of low commodity prices, in particular domestic support and tariff escalation, the Doha work programme offers an opportunity to make a positive impact on the problem.

... and the proliferation of regional trade agreements.

The global trading system has seen a sharp increase in regional trade agreements (RTAs) over the past decade or so. As of March 2003, only four WTO Members – Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Mongolia and Chinese Taipei – were not party to a regional trade agreement. And with the sole exception of Mongolia, these WTO Members are all engaged in negotiations on preferential agreements.

The motivations for regionalism are many. The possibility for co-operation at the multilateral level may be absent or attenuated. Governments may wish to go further, faster and at lower cost than is feasible in a multilateral setting. Regional agreements can also be interpreted as a defensive necessity, to avoid exclusion, or as a means of increasing bargaining power in a broader setting. Politically, preferential trade arrangements can help to consolidate regional security and tie in commitments that are more fragile if they need only be answered to in a national context. And of course, protectionist motives can also drive pressure for regional arrangements.

An attraction of RTAs is that by providing tariff preferences or duty-free treatment to goods originating from its members, more trade is created among them. But the available data do not provide strong empirical evidence that many RTAs expand trade among members any faster than trade taking place outside preferential arrangements. Some of the reasons for this are that, in the case of developed countries, MFN duties on many products are already at zero. Traders may choose to forgo preferential treatment because the costs of satisfying the requisite rules of origin might be higher than the advantage offered by the preferential margin. RTAs also often exempt the most sensitive sectors, which enjoy the highest protection, from significant liberalization.

Regionalism can serve as a catalyst for further liberalization at the multilateral level. But the increasing number of regional agreements may also represent a threat to multilateral liberalization. A multiplicity of regional agreements will almost certainly engender a degree of trade diversion, and the application of numerous rules of origin and differing standards will make international trade more complex and costly. The growing number of overlapping bilateral and plurilateral agreements risks undermining the transparency of trading rules, thus posing a threat to some of the fundamental principles of the WTO. Regional trading arrangements may create vested interests determined to avoid any dilution of preferential margins implied by multilateral trade liberalization. Finally, increasing regionalism will tend to distract attention and energy from multilateral negotiations.

Two ground rules of policy behaviour could help to consolidate and build upon the benefits of regionalism and promote a more effective multilateral trading system. The first rule would be to refrain from engaging in regional commitments (on issues covered within the mandate of the WTO) which governments would be unwilling, sooner or later, to extend to a multilateral setting. The second would be to consolidate the first rule by agreeing to a consultative system that would map and monitor the timing and conditions attached to the non-discriminatory, multilateral application of commitments made in regional arrangements. Such arrangements might provide a more effective link between regionalism and multilateralism than exists today.

2. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Meeting the challenges of development requires additional resources and better use of existing ones.

Development is a process in which people through their work, investment and trade are able to secure basic needs, education, health, a comfortable standard of living and freedom for themselves and future generations. Attaining these objectives requires considerable economic resources, and economic growth is therefore a necessary condition for development, particularly in least-developed and other low-income countries. The relationship between economic growth and development is reflected in a strong, although not perfect, correlation between income and human development measured by indicators of health and education.

Openness can help on both accounts,...

Over time the international community has learnt from experience that severe impediments to international trade are detrimental to economic growth. The general picture is that open, export-oriented countries have succeeded in their development efforts, while heavily protected and inward-looking countries have not. There is a clear positive correlation between openness and income and there is little evidence that the countries that have protected infant or so-called dynamic sectors have done better than more open, export-oriented economies. It is important to bear in mind that international trade is about countries complementing each other through specialization and the exchange of goods and services, thereby creating a bigger pie. Trade is not about competing for slices of a pie with a pre-determined size. All countries have comparative advantage.

...creating a conducive climate for investment,...

An open economy that specializes in its areas of comparative advantage can make investments more effective and at the same time create incentives for additional investment, generally leading to a faster rate of growth than can be achieved in less open economies.

...exchanging ideas,…

Consumers of imported products can expose producers in developing countries to quality requirements and expectations about delivery reliability, which provide incentives for cost efficiency and for upgrading technology in line with market requirements. Furthermore, foreign firms sourcing inputs from developing countries often help their suppliers deliver high quality services and intermediate products in a timely and reliable manner.

Rapid adoption of technology, which is developed in rich countries and embodied in machinery and equipment imported by developing countries, is more likely when such goods face low trade barriers in importing countries. Trade data suggest that a relatively large amount of knowledge flows to developing countries through trade and there is considerable potential for higher flows of technology, particularly to Africa and LDCs. Embodied technology is often complementary to disembodied technology such as organizational and managerial innovations. Openness to trade in services helps transfer such disembodied technology.

...and improving the quality of institutions.

Trade and foreign direct investment require that traders are confident, contracts will be enforced, payments will be made and property rights to tangible and intangible assets are well defined. Countries with a better track record in such matters are therefore likely to trade more. On the other hand, openness may also have a positive effect on the quality of institutions. Lower trade barriers may, for example, increase the incentives for individuals and governments to improve the formal and informal rules governing commercial interactions in order to induce more trade. Trade in itself can increase the knowledge and understanding of foreign institutions and potentially lead to institutional reform. Empirical research confirms two-way causality, with institutional quality having a positive effect on openness and openness having a positive impact on institutional quality.

Countries that have better institutions grow faster, which suggests that trade can also have an indirect effect on incomes by improving institutional quality.

The poor can benefit from trade liberalization.

There appears to be a popular perception that globalization has widened income gaps both within and among countries. Yet empirical evidence shows that rapid growth in China and India following trade liberalization has contributed to a narrowing global income gap when the gap is measured in a way that takes the size of populations into account.

In numerous developing countries income distribution has become more equal during periods of trade liberalization. Some, however, experienced increasing income inequality. Several reasons have been put forward for this phenomenon. Emphasis has been placed on the role of technological progress in recent decades, which often took place in parallel with trade liberalization. New technologies have arguably shifted labour demand away from low-skilled labour, thus exercising downward pressure on the income of lower-skilled, often low-income earners. Trade and foreign direct investment have played a role in transferring these technologies from industrialized to developing countries.

The impact of trade liberalization on income distribution in a particular country also depends on the pattern of protection before liberalization at home and abroad and on the country's comparative advantage. Because the poor in developing countries are often located in rural areas and employed in agriculture, how trade reform affects agriculture will critically affect its overall impact on poverty alleviation. It cannot be excluded that the relatively slow pace of trade liberalization in agriculture has been negative for the poor in certain developing countries.

In order to obtain a more complete picture of the effect of trade on poverty, one has to look at the combined effect of trade on growth and on income inequality. If the growth effect is strong enough, increased income inequality may well go hand in hand with poverty alleviation. Empirical evidence for some countries indeed confirms that trade liberalization was accompanied by significant reductions in absolute poverty even though income inequality increased at the same time.

Engagement in the multilateral trading system allows a country to increase the benefits of openness.

Given a willingness by countries to benefit from trade, four reasons are presented why international co-operation through binding commitments on market openness and trade rules will make a country better off. The first of these relates to the economic and political advantages of reciprocity, even in circumstances where developing countries do not give full reciprocity. A second reason for favouring co-operation involving participation in a system of binding international rights and obligations relates to transactions costs. Third, trade is likely to expand and be more profitable under conditions of certainty and security as to the terms of market access and the rules of trade – pre-commitment around a set of rules also diminishes the role of power and size in determining outcomes. Fourth, international commitments are a way of strengthening the hand of a government in the face of pressure from special interests.

The Doha Development Agenda provides an opportunity to solidify progress made in previous rounds and identify ways to address the needs of the growing WTO membership.

Since the GATT was signed in 1947, membership has increased from 23 to 146 Members of the WTO in April 2003. The majority of new Members are developing countries and more recently countries in transition. Managing growing diversity in economic characteristics, needs and priorities has been a growing challenge for the multilateral system. It has been acknowledged that the international community needs to help developing countries to strengthen their capacity to participate more fully in international trade and to participate in deliberations and make their voices heard. The Doha Development Agenda outlines a work programme for the implementation of these objectives, reaffirms the role of special and differential treatment in fostering development, and acknowledges the need for effective capacity building and technical assistance. It also outlines the development dimensions of market access, rules-related issues and dispute settlement.

The highest levels of protection in developed country markets are against products of export interest to developing countries,...

The average applied tariff on manufactured goods in developed countries is very low, and slightly more than half of world imports are traded duty free. Nevertheless, two of the sectors that are of greatest export interest to developing countries, agriculture and textiles and clothing, were insulated from multilateral trade negotiations until the Uruguay Round. Tariff rates are significantly higher in these sectors than the average for merchandise trade, and quotas in textiles and clothing will remain until 2005. Tariff peaks and tariff escalation are also more common in these sectors. Domestic support and export subsidies in agriculture further distort trade to the disadvantage of developing countries, particularly the least-developed countries. In the services sectors, the number of commitments is the lowest in Mode 4 – movement of natural persons – which is a Mode of great interest to developing countries.

...but these impediments are also pronounced in developing country markets, which impedes South-South trade.

A country's average applied and bound tariff rates, as well as the incidence of these rates above 15 per cent, are negatively related to per capita income. Furthermore, developing countries are no different from developed countries when it comes to protecting the industries of particular export interest to other developing countries. These characteristics of the tariff profile of WTO Members determine the landscape of negotiating positions and opportunities to enhance the participation of developing countries in the multilateral trading system.

Facilitating openness for development requires that concerns about special and differential treatment are addressed, with the aim of creating better opportunities for developing countries to engage in the multilateral trading system.

Many developing country interests and priorities are reflected in the issues of special and differential treatment, technical assistance and capacity building. In addition, certain areas of the Doha work programme of particular interest to developing countries include trade and the transfer of technology, trade, debt and finance, and small economies. Trade-related intellectual property issues of particular interest to developing countries are examined briefly from a development perspective, such as access to medicines as well as access to genetic resources and the protection of traditional knowledge.

Special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions are key to the search for balance, relevance and priority as Members seek to define the contribution of the Doha Agenda to development. Special and differential treatment is hardly a panacea, however, if it is interpreted merely as an effort to minimize commitments on the part of developing countries within the system. But just as efforts to accept as little as possible by way of commitments will offer scant contribution to development, so too will coercive WTO commitments de-linked from a properly articulated national economic interest. Special and differential treatment provisions should focus on policy design and timing questions, and on aligning contractual commitments in the WTO with development needs and priorities. If "one size does not fit all", how should differentiated needs be accommodated by appropriately differentiated provisions without imparting excessive discretion, either to those who have access to S&D or those who make those access decisions? One way of trying to ensure relevance is to design provisions that intrinsically define beneficiaries, through such means as thresholds or triggers.

Developing country engagement in the system can be made more effective through the efficient delivery of trade-related technical assistance and capacity building.

The Doha Declaration marked a new departure in the GATT/WTO approach to technical assistance and capacity building. Many ingredients go into effective technical assistance and capacity building, and the scope of the WTO's contribution is circumscribed by its functions and competence. The WTO's efforts are focused on human capital development. This essentially concerns the acquisition of knowledge about international trade and the trading system, combined with the technical skills to identify, articulate and defend national interests in the field of trade. Other agencies and governments provide similar support in this area. Some of them are also engaged in other aspects of assistance and capacity building, such as providing physical infrastructure and support in other areas of economic policy. The joint provision of support makes coherence among agencies and governments involved essential for effectiveness.

Multilateral co-operation could be an avenue to ease the access to essential medicines for developing countries.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases can be contained, but the required medicines are expensive and beyond the economic means of those countries that are most affected. Some developing countries have the capacity to produce generic versions of patented drugs. Many others are able to import such drugs, and the TRIPS Agreement allows them to do so under a compulsory licence. It also allows them to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted. However, the TRIPS Agreement requires that compulsory licences are to be granted predominantly for the supply of the domestic market. The problem is, therefore, how to ensure that supplies of generic versions of essential patented medicines can be available to developing countries without local capacity to produce if they should wish to import under a compulsory licence. Members have come close to a positive solution to this problem, but the major point of disagreement is the scope of public health problems or diseases to be covered by the proposed solution.

While on this issue and some others developing countries focus on the flexibilities provided under the TRIPS Agreement, in other areas, such as the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore or the extension of geographical indications, many of them look to the potential gains of tighter multilateral disciplines and see the WTO as a possible forum for this purpose.

Managing openness requires the multilateral trading system to have clear rules, flexibility,….

Safeguards, anti-dumping measures and countervailing measures allow governments to restrict trade temporarily in response to unforeseen circumstances and unfair trade practices that would disrupt the domestic market. Developing countries are permitted to restrict trade for balance-of-payments reasons and in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising living standards. The availability of contingency protection measures may allow governments to go further in opening markets than they would in the absence of protection against unforeseen circumstances and unfair trade practices. Furthermore, the threat of such measures may discipline trading partners to abide by the rules. Nevertheless, contingent measures are costly if they go further than necessary to address the situation at hand and if they are poorly designed. There is a need to clarify and improve these rules and take into account the needs of developing countries during the Doha negotiations.

… effective enforcement of rules, and sanctions when rules are broken.

The WTO dispute settlement system has worked well. It is a measure of last resort, and about three quarters of the complaints raised do not proceed beyond consultations to the panel stage. However, using the dispute settlement mechanism involves considerable costs that some developing countries are not able to meet. The cost of preparing a case can be substantial, and retaliation of a small country against a larger one is not always attractive in cases where the latter chooses not to comply with a finding. Permitted retaliation involves suspension of concessions and that may hurt the winning party as much as the losing party, particularly when a developing country wins a dispute with a developed country. Improvements and clarifications of the existing system are on the Doha Agenda.

Success in lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers calls for consideration of 'beyond border' issues such as investment and competition policy.

Changing business practices and a more liberal trading system are combining to create a more competitive global economy and increasing the flows of foreign direct investment. In response to the challenge of ensuring an open and equitable trading environment, Members are exploring the extension of further multilateral disciplines in the fields of investment and competition. Both issues have been discussed within the multilateral system since the Havana Charter preceding the GATT and gained new prominence at the First WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996. Gains can accrue from liberalization of investment flows just as they can from the liberalization of trade flows. This suggests a clear case for international co-operation, so the questions for

Members concern the reach of rules (scope), the architecture of any agreement, the appropriate forum, and the opportunity cost of resources devoted to such efforts.

The case for co-ordination and co-operation on competition policy issues is clear, especially where there are policy spillovers, be they negative (export cartels) or positive (coherent and mutually supportive national regimes). Once again decisions on how to move forward turn on questions of scope, architecture, forum and opportunity costs.

CONCLUSION

This Report has ranged widely. The Executive Summary attached to the beginning of the Report outlines the main areas covered and observations made. A report of this nature is itself a summary of complex issues and has to rely heavily on the more detailed and analytical work of others. References have been made in the text to this work. Many of the issues addressed here are "moving targets", particularly where governments are constantly exercising policy options that exert an influence on outcomes and where WTO Members are actively engaged in a major trade negotiation.

Much of the Report has concentrated on development-related issues, recognising that one of the most pressing challenges facing the multilateral trading system is its capacity to respond effectively to the development needs of the majority of the WTO membership. But the efficacy of the system as a whole cannot turn only on the narrow, albeit crucial question of what developing countries need from it; the system must also be concerned with forging a set of arrangements that respond to the needs of the larger and richer countries. Neglect of the interests of any country or group of countries inevitably weakens the system and over time will undermine its global character.

The Report makes a strong case for intensified engagement in the multilateral trading system. The arguments apply to all the membership and are especially pertinent in the midst of a negotiation. Joint responsibility does not mean undifferentiated responsibility, however, and some countries are better placed than others to make a difference. This proposition is implicit in much of the analysis contained in the Report. The WTR also argues that if negotiating positions are not firmly rooted in a clear and coherent framework defined in terms of the national interest, opportunities to use the system to promote development will be missed. This means that negotiated outcomes should not give rise to the assumption by some countries of involuntary commitments. It also means countries should recognize that a reluctance or refusal to negotiate any commitments is a non-neutral policy stance that is bound to carry consequences in terms of lost opportunity.

TECHNICAL NOTES

(a) Composition of country groups

(i) Regions

North America: Canada, United States of America, and territories in North America n.e.s.

Latin America: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and other countries and territories in Latin America and the Caribbean n.e.s.

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia (the last five countries mentioned comprise the former Yugoslavia), and territories in Western Europe n.e.s.

Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (transition economies), of which *Central and Eastern Europe*: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic; *the Baltic States*: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and *the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The grouping *former USSR* refers to the Baltic States and the CIS.

Africa, of which *North Africa*: Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco and Tunisia; and *Sub-Saharan Africa* comprising: *Western Africa*: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo; *Central Africa*: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe; *Eastern Africa*: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda; and *Southern Africa:* Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and territories in Africa n.e.s.

The Middle East: Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and other countries and territories in the Middle East n.e.s.

Asia, of which *West Asia*: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; and *East Asia (including Oceania):* Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; China; Fiji; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (Hong Kong, China); Indonesia; Japan; Kiribati; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Macao, China; Malaysia; Mongolia; Myanmar; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Republic of Korea; Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei); Thailand; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu; Viet Nam and other countries and territories in Asia and the Pacific n.e.s.

(ii) Regional Integration Agreements

ANDEAN: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

APEC: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; Philippines; Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America and Viet Nam.

ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.

CACM: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

CARICOM: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

CEFTA: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic.

CEMAC (UDEAC): Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

COMESA: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

ECCAS: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.

ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

European Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

GCC: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

LAIA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

MERCOSUR: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

NAFTA: Canada, Mexico and the United States of America.

SAARC: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

SADC: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

UEMOA: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

(iii) Other country groups

Least-developed countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia.

The designations used in this report do not imply an expression of opinion by the Secretariat concerning either the status of any country, territory or area, or the delimitation of its frontiers.

(b) Tariff calculations

The tariff calculations in Section IIB were based on data available in the WTO's Consolidated Tariff Schedules database (CTS) and the Integrated Data Base (IDB), as well as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS).

Tariff profiles for MFN final bound duties were taken from the CTS, which include final bound duties and other information such as implementation periods and initial negotiating rights. It covers all WTO Members, contains all commitments on goods including pre and post Uruguay Round negotiations and is updated regularly.[1] The tariff profiles for bound duties are shown for 128 Members.[2]

Tariff profiles for MFN statutory applied duties are taken, in the first instance, from the IDB. The IDB, based on Members' notifications, contains MFN applied and current bound duties and import statistics. It also includes preferences and *ad valorem* equivalents (AVEs) for non *ad valorem* tariff lines if provided by Members on a voluntary basis. The database covers 107 Members and acceding countries for which processed information is available. In each case the latest available year has been selected.

UNCTAD's TRAINS database contains tariff, non-tariff measures and trade information. The tariff information is compiled by UNCTAD based on national, inter-governmental and other sources and is available at the tariff line level. The trade information is mostly sourced from the United Nations Statistical Division COMTRADE database (see below), and is available at the HS 6-digit level only.

To improve cross-country comparability, the tariff profiles in section IIB and the Appendix Tables have been compiled at the Harmonised System (HS) 6-digit level taking into account tariff lines in chapters 01 to 97. The HS 6-digit level product classification offers a common structure that is not biased by the different levels of disaggregation in Members' tariffs. For the calculation of HS 6-digit duty averages and maxima, only *ad valorem* duties, including AVEs if supplied by the Member, were used. However, the incidence of non *ad valorem* duties (specific, mixed, or compound duties) is indicated in all tables.

The first step in the calculations consisted of aggregating both bound and applied tariff line data up to the 6-digit level. With respect to bound duties, only bound tariff lines were taken into account in the calculations. No assumptions were made as to the duty of unbound tariff lines. Therefore, any 6-digit subheading was considered to be bound if at least one tariff line within that subheading was bound, and the duty averages were calculated only on bound tariff lines. Any 6-digit subheading, where no tariff line within that subheading was bound, was considered to be unbound. Unbound subheadings were not included in the calculations in Appendix Tables IIB.1-3. All subsequent calculations were based on these 'pre-aggregated' HS 6-digit duty averages.

In the case of tariff-rate quotas, in-quota duties have been included in the calculations for Canada, Japan, Philippines and the United States.

It should be noted that in the case of data sourced from UNCTAD in Appendix Tables IIB.4-7 only simple averages and coefficients of variation were calculated using HS 6-digit duty averages. The other indicators are calculated on a tariff line basis.

[1] Data for Armenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, two recently acceded countries, have not yet been processed for inclusion in the CTS and are therefore not yet included in the tables.

[2] The Member states of the European Union are counted as one, and Switzerland and Liechtenstein are also counted as one.

(c) EU/EC

For Legal reasons, the European Union (EU) is known officially as the European Communities (EC) in WTO business. The use of either term in this Report depends on the specific context, but can be taken to refer to the same entity. The EC is a WTO Member in its own right as are each of its 15 member States – making 16 WTO Members altogether.

(d) Chart specific technical notes

Chart IIB.2 Per cent of duty free MFN lines and duty free MFN imports, selected economies

The percentage of MFN applied duty free lines was calculated at the HS 6-digit level as described above. The share of duty free imports was calculated using COMTRADE data at the HS 6-digit level.

Chart IIB.3 Average MFN rate by product category

The description of each of the categories is provided in Technical Note Table 1. Categories 01-11 and 97 are considered non-agricultural products. The average tariff rates were calculated using IDB data, hence the tariffs for agricultural products are the out-of-quota tariffs (except as specified above) and exclude non *ad valorem* lines.

Technical Note Table 1
Description of Multilateral Trade Negotiation Categories

CATEGORY		HARMONIZED SYSTEM NOMENCLATURE HS 1996
No.	DESCRIPTION	
01	Wood, pulp, paper and furniture	Ch. 44, 45, 47, 4801-14, 4816-23, Ch. 49, 9401-04.
02	Textiles and clothing	3005, 3306, 3921, 4202, Ch. 50-63 (except 5001-03, 5101-03, 5201-02, 5301-02), 6405-06, 6501-05, 6601, 7019, 8708, 8804, 9113, 9502, 9612.
03	Leather, rubber, footwear and travel goods	Ch. 40, 41 (except 4101-03), 4201, 4203-05, Ch. 43 (except 4301), Ch. 64, 9605.
04	Metals	2601-17, 2620, Ch. 72, 7301-20, 7323-26, Ch. 74-76, 78-82, 8301-03, 8306-11.
05	Chemicals and photographic supplies	2705, Ch. 28-30 (except 3005), Ch. 32-33 (except 3301 and 3306), 3401-02, 3404-05, 3407, 3506-07, 3601-04 and Ch. 37-39 (except 3823 and 3921).
06	Transport equipment	8601-07, 8609, 8701-07, 8711-14, 8716, 8801-03, 8901-08.
07	Non-electric machinery	7321-22, Ch. 84, 8608, 8709.
08	Electric machinery	8501-18 and 8525-48.
09	Mineral products and precious stones and precious metals	Ch. 25, 2618-19, 2621, 2701-04, 2706- 08, 2711-15, Ch.31, 3403, 6801-06, 6808-15, Ch. 69-71 (except 7019).
10	Manufactured articles not elsewhere specified	2716, 3406, 3605-06, 4206, 4601-02, 4815, 6506-07, 6602-03, 6701-04, 6807, 8304-05, 8519-24, 8710, 8715, 8805, Ch. 90, 9101-12, 9114, Ch. 92-93, 9405-06 and Ch. 95-97 (except 9502, 9605 and 9612).
11	Fish and fish products	Ch. 03, 0509, 1504, 1603-05, 2301.
12	Fruit and vegetables	Ch. 07, Ch. 08, 1105-06, 2001-08.
13	Coffee, tea, maté,cocoa and preparations	0901-03, Ch. 18 (except 1802), 2101.
14	Sugars and sugar confectionery	Ch. 17.
15	Spices, cereal and other food preparations	0407-10, 0904-10, 1101-04, 1107-09, Ch. 19, 2102-06, 2209.
16	Grains	Ch. 10.
17	Animals and products thereof	Ch. 01, Ch. 02, 1601-02.
18	Oil seeds, fats and oils and their products	1201-08, Ch. 15 (except 1504), 2304-06, 3823.
19	Cut flowers, plants, vegetable materials; lacs, etc.	0601-03, 1211, Ch. 13, Ch. 14.
20	Beverages and spirits	2009, 2201-08.
21	Dairy products	0401-06.
22	Tobacco	Ch. 24.
23	Other agricultural products	Ch.05 (except 0509), 0604, 1209-10, 1212-14, 1802, 2301-10, 2302-03, 2307-09, 290543-45, 3301, 3501-05, 3809-10, 382460, 4101-03, 4301, 5001- 03, 5101-03, 5201-03, 5301-02.
97	Petroleum	2709-10.

Chart IIB.4 Tariff escalation in agricultural products and in selected agricultural categories

The methodology for calculating the average tariff is the same as Chart IIB.3. The product description for the three categories is provided in Technical Note Table 1. It should be noted that the calculations use out of quota rates and do not take into account non *ad valorem* duties. The categories for the three stages of production are described in WTO (2001b).

Chart IIB.5 Tariff profile of non-agricultural products

The data for bound and applied tariffs are sourced from the WTO CTS and IDB databases as presented in Appendix Tables IIB.3 and IIB.6. The per capita GDP data is for the year 2000 from the World Bank, World Development Indicators database.

Chart IIB.6 Tariff escalation in non-agricultural products and selected categories

The methodology for calculating the average tariff is the same as Chart IIB.3. The product description for the three categories is provided in Technical Note Table 1. It should be noted that the calculations do not take into account non *ad valorem* duties. The categories for the three stages of production are described in WTO (2001b).

Appendix Tables IIB.1-3

The description of the database was provided above. Technical Note Table 2 provides a description of each of the column headings in Appendix Tables IIB.1-3 on bound rates.

Technical Note Table 2
Description of table headings in Appendix Tables IIB.1-3

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">COLUMN HEADING</th><th>DESCRIPTION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Import market</td><td>WTO Member.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Binding coverage (per cent)</td><td>Number of HS subheadings containing at least one bound tariff line divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings of the corresponding version of the HS nomenclature (all products - HS92: 5020, HS96: 5113; non-agricultural products, as defined by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture – HS92: 4357, HS96: 4436).</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Simple average</td><td>Simple average of the ad valorem final bound HS 6-digit duties.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Coefficient of variation</td><td>A measure of the relative dispersion of tariffs and is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of the final bound HS 6-digit duties.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Maximum</td><td>Maximum ad valorem final bound duty based on tariff line duties.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Last year of implementation</td><td>Latest final year of implementation.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Duty free (per cent)</td><td>Number of HS subheadings for which all tariff line duties are equal to zero, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Dutiable (per cent):</td><td>Total</td><td>Number of HS subheadings for which not all tariff line duties are equal to zero, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Non ad valorem</td><td>Number of HS subheadings having at least one non ad valorem duty without ad valorem equivalent, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings. Duties not provided were treated as non ad valorem.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">International peaks (per cent)</td><td>Number of HS 6-digit duties higher than 15 per cent, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">National peaks (per cent)</td><td>Number of HS 6-digit duties at least three times higher than the Member's overall simple average, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Other Duties and Charges (ODCs):</td><td>Simple average</td><td>Simple average of the ODCs with ad valorem HS 6-digit duties.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Maximum</td><td>Maximum ad valorem ODC duty based on tariff line duties.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Non ad valorem (per cent)</td><td>Number of HS subheadings having at least one non ad valorem ODC duty, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.</td></tr>
</table>

Appendix Tables IIB.4-6

Technical Note Table 3
Description of table headings in Appendix Tables IIB.4-6

COLUMN HEADING		DESCRIPTION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
Import market		WTO Member or acceding country.
Year		Year of the tariff.
Total number of tariff lines		Total number of tariff lines in the Members' tariff schedule, including suffixes.
Simple average		Simple average of the *ad valorem* MFN applied HS 6-digit duties, taking into account AVEs if submitted for the IDB.
Coefficient of variation		A measure of the relative dispersion of tariffs and is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of the HS 6-digit applied duties.
Maximum		Maximum *ad valorem* MFN applied duty based on tariff line duties, taking into account AVEs if submitted for the IDB.
Duty free (per cent)		Number of HS subheadings for which all tariff line duties are equal to zero, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.
Dutiable (per cent):	Total	Number of HS subheadings for which not all tariff line duties are equal to zero, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.
	Non *ad valorem*	Number of HS subheadings having at least one non *ad valorem* duty without *ad valorem* equivalent, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings. Duties not provided were treated as non *ad valorem*.
International peaks (per cent)		Number of HS 6-digit duties higher than 15 per cent, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.
National peaks (per cent)		Number of HS 6-digit duties at least three times higher than the Member's overall simple average, divided by the respective total number of HS subheadings.

Appendix Table IIB.7

Tariff data was sourced from both the WTO IDB database and the UNCTAD TRAINs database. The product categories are listed in Technical Note Table 1.

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