What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

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Abstract

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Keywords: Redistribution, Political Economy, International Trade, Institutions

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Policy making power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated. This paper investigates quantitatively the welfare mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countries.

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1. Introduction

Although all governments are endowed with policymaking powers to redistribute income to powerful interests in society, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. Government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and institutional factors. For instance, in the presence of weak system of checks and balances or a low level of political competition, it may be easier for governments to redistribute resources towards those special interests they favor. It is the goal of this paper to study quantitatively the relative welfare mindedness of governments in a large sample of countries and to try and understand the differences in government behavior across countries using economic, political and institutional factors.

We proceed in two steps. The first step is to quantify the extent to which governments are concerned with aggregate welfare relative to any other private interests. This requires data in which the redistributive powers of governments are inherent, and which reflect this particular tradeoff between aggregate and private interest. In our analysis, we use trade policy determination as the context in which government behavior is evaluated. There are at least two reasons for this. First, it is well-established in theory and in empirical work that trade policy, like many other government policies, is redistributive and is used extensively by governments to favor certain constituents over others.¹ Second, the recent theoretical literature in this area (following the work of Grossman and Helpman (1994) offers a parsimonious and empirically amenable structural platform that is particularly suitable for estimating the primary parameter of interest: the relative preference of a governments for aggregate welfare over private rents, i.e., the welfare-mindedness of governments.²

In the second step of our analysis, we attempt to explain the estimated cross-country variation in government behavior using theory-based political, institutional and economic variables. The empirical analysis undertaken is structural in nature, and allows us to determine test theories about

¹For indirect evidence on the Ricardo-Viner model of specific factors using voting data see Hiscox (2002), Bohara et al. (2004), Baldwin and Magee (2000), and McGillivray (1997). More direct evidence of governments favoring special interest groups in their trade policy decisions, and therefore exploiting the trade off between welfare and rents, by Schattschneider (1935) and Baldwin (1985) have spawned an enormous literature in economics and political science.

²Empirical contributions in this area, largely focused on US data include Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhay (2000), McCalman (2002), Mitra *et al.* (2002), and Eicher and Osang, 2003) See Krishna and Gawande (2003) for a recent survey.

how institutions condition the behavior of governments. At the same time, we are able to explore associations between political, institutional and economic variables on the one hand, and the preferences of policy-makers on the other. The structural theory-based empirical analysis distinguishes our study from other cross-country studies that reveal associations between institutions and policy outcomes.

Our results, obtained using data from over fifty countries, suggest that there is substantial variance across countries in the relative weight that their governments place on aggregate social welfare. For instance, the estimates for countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Malawi are about a hundred times lower than for Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and the United States.

What might explain this variation in the behavior of governments? In order to answer this question, we formally consider trade policy to be the outcome of electoral competition and legislative bargaining. These theories suggest institutional, political and economic variables that may explain the variance in governments' inclination to maximize social welfare. Empirically, we report a number of new findings. The greater the proportion of the population that is informed, the more is the government's concern for welfare. The less ideologically beholden the public is to the parties in the legislature, the more welfare-maximizing their government. The more productive is media advertising, the greater is the demand by politicians for special interest money in order to sway the (uninformed) public while contesting elections. Therefore, the lower is the government's concern for welfare. Checks and balances on the powers of the legislature (by the executive), and divided government also increase welfare. Electoral competition for the executive the ability of the executive to provide effective checks since candidates for the executive must satisfy special interests in order to use their money to sway (uninformed) voters in election campaigns.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive a prediction from the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous trade policy determination that enables estimation of the welfare-mindedness of governments. Industry-level data from fifty four countries are used in the estimation exercises. These data and the resulting estimates are described in Section 3. Section 4 derives predictions that are applicable to trade policy from theories of electoral competition and legislative bargaining. A number of hypotheses about the relationship between specific institutional variables and the welfare-mindedness of governments are stated. These hypotheses are then taken to the data in section 5. The variables are described and the results are empirically analyzed. Section 6 concludes.

2. What Governments Maximize: Theory

This section presents the Grossman-Helpman (1994, henceforth GH) model. It provides the theoretical basis for our estimates of the extent of government concern for welfare relative to private gain. Our notation borrows liberally from their exposition and that of Goldberg and Maggi (1999). Consider a small open economy with n + 1 tradable sectors. Individuals in this economy are assumed to have identical preferences over consumption of these goods represented by the utility function:

$$U = c_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i(c_i),$$
(1)

where good 0 is the numeraire good whose price is normalized to one. The additively separability of the utility functions eliminates cross-effects among goods. Consumer surplus from the consumption of good *i*, s_i , as a function of its price, p_i , is given by $s_i(p_i) = u(d(p_i)) - p_i d(p_i)$, where $d(p_i)$ is the demand function for good *i*. The indirect utility function for individual *k* is given by $v^k = y^k + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^k(p_i)$, where y^k is the income of individual *k*.

On the production side the numeraire good is produced using labor only under constant returns to scale, which fixes the wage at one. The other n goods are produced with constant returns to scale technology, each using labor and a sector-specific input. The specific input is in limited supply and earns rents. The price of good i determines the returns to the specific factor i, denoted $\pi_{(p_i)}$. factor. The supply function of good i is given by $y_i(p_i) = \pi'_{(p_i)}$. Since rents to owners of a specific input increase with the price of the good that uses the specific input, owners of that specific input have a motive for influencing government policy in a manner that raises the good's price.

Government uses trade policy, specifically tariffs, that protect producers of import-competing goods and raise their domestic price. The world price of each good is taken as given. For good *i* the government chooses a specific (per unit) import tariff t_i^s to drive a wedge between the world price p_i^0 and the domestic price p_i , $p_i = p_i^0 + t_i^s$. The tariff revenue is distributed equally across the population in a lump-sum manner.

Summing indirect utility across all individuals yields aggregate welfare W. Aggregate income is the sum of labor income (denoted l), the returns to specific factors, and tariff revenue. Therefore aggregate welfare (as a function of domestic prices) is given by:

$$W = l + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \pi_i(p_i) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} t_i^s M_i(p_i) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i(p_i),$$
(2)

where imports $M_i = d_i - y_i$.

We also assume that the proportion of the population of a country that is represented by organized lobbies is negligible.³. This allow us to ignore the incentives to lobby for lower tariffs on goods that are consumed, but not produced by owners of specific factors, as well as the incentives to lobby for higher tariffs on goods that are neither consumed nor produced, but that generate tariff revenue. While this assumption is imposed on the theoretical model, it is based on relatively solid empirical grounds, as consumer (and taxation) lobbies are uncommon relatively to producer lobbies. In other words, in our setup lobbies only care about the rents to their specific factor. More formally, the objective function is simply given by:

$$W_i = \pi_i(p_i). \tag{3}$$

The objective function of the government reflects the trade-off between social welfare and lobbyists' political contributions. These contributions may be used for personal gain, or to finance re-election campaigns, or a variety of other self-interested expenditures that may buy the government favor with its constituents. Thus, as in the Grossman-Helpman model the government's objective function is a weighted sum of campaign contributions, C, and the welfare of its constituents, W:

$$G = aW + C = aW + \sum_{i \in L} C_i, \tag{4}$$

where the parameter a is the weight government puts on a dollar of welfare relative to a dollar of lobbying contributions. Lobby i makes contribution C_i to the government, and therefore maximizes an objective function given by $W_i - C_i$.

We presume that the equilibrium tariffs arise from a Nash bargaining game between the government and lobbies. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) show that this leads to the same solution as does the use of

 $^{^{3}}$ In our framework, this is equivalent to assuming that ownership of specific factors used in production is highly concentrated in all sectors

the menu auction model employed in Grossman and Helpman (1994). The Nash bargaining solution maximizes the joint surplus of the government and lobbies given by the sum of the government's welfare G and the welfare of each lobby net of its contributions. The joint surplus boils down to

$$\Omega = aW + \sum_{i} W_i,\tag{5}$$

Note that (5) implicitly assumes that all sectors are politically organized. This is true of manufacturing sectors in most advanced countries, where political action committees (U.S.) or industry associations (Europe) lobby their governments. Such industry coalitions are prevalent in developing countries as well. Other than in the U.S., rules and regulations requiring lobbying activity to be reported are blatantly absent. We take this non transparency to be not only a data constraint in our modeling, but also a proof of the pervasiveness of lobbying activity. Also, since our analysis is conducted at the aggregation level of 29 ISIC 3-digit level industries, the assumption that all industries are organized is an empirically reasonable one.⁴

Under these two assumptions, the joint surplus takes the simple form:

$$\Omega = l + \sum_{i=1}^{n} [a+1]\pi_i + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a(t_i^s M_i + s_i),$$
(6)

The first order conditions are:⁵

$$[a+1]X_i + a[-d_i + t_i^s M_i'(p_i) + M_i] = 0, \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$
(7)

Solving, we get the tariff on each good that maximizes the joint surplus:

$$\frac{t_i}{1+t_i} = \frac{1}{a} \left(\frac{X_i/M_i}{e_i}\right), \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$
(8)

⁴For instance, in US data, significant contributions to the political process are reported by all 3-digit industries (and indeed industries at much finer levels of disaggregation).

⁵Differentiating with respect to the specific tariff on good $i t_i^s$ is equivalent to differentiating with respect to the price of good $i p_i$, since $p_i = p_i^0 + t_i^s$. The derivatives of profits and consumer surplus are as follows: $\pi'_i(p_i) = X_i$ or output of good i, and $s'_i(p_i) = d_i$ or demand for good i.

In (8) $t_i = (p_i - p_i^0)/p_i^0$ is the ad valorem tariff for good *i*, where p_i is the domestic price for good *i* in Home and p_i^0 its world price. X_i/M_i is the equilibrium ratio of output to imports and $e_i = -M'_i \cdot p_i/M_i$ is the absolute elasticity of import demand. Thus, producers of good *i* are able to "buy" protection ($t_i > 0$). Industry output X_i captures the size of rents from protection. Imports determine the extent of welfare losses from protection, so the smaller are imports the higher is the tariff. The Ramsey pricing logic is inherent in (8). The lower the absolute elasticity e_i , the higher the tariff.

3. What Governments Maximize: Comparative estimates of a

Equation (8) suggests a simple way of estimating the trade-off parameter a. Rewrite (8) as

$$\frac{t_i}{1+t_i} \cdot e_i \cdot \frac{M_i}{X_i} = \frac{1}{a} \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

$$\tag{9}$$

We use a stochastic version of this equation to estimate the parameter a. The data, described below, are across industries and time for each of 54 countries. Indexing the time series by t, the econometric model we use to estimate the a's is

$$\frac{t_{it}}{1+t_{it}} \cdot e_i \cdot \frac{M_{it}}{X_{it}} = \beta_0 + \epsilon_{it} \qquad i = 1, \dots, n,$$
(10)

where the error term ϵ_{it} is identically independently normally distributed across observations for any specific country, with homoscedastic variance σ^2 . The variance is allowed to vary across countries. The coefficient $\beta_0 = \frac{1}{a}$. The assumption that all sectors are organized allows us to take the outputto-import ratio and import elasticity to the left-hand side (lhs) of the equation. This mutes issues concerning endogeneity to tariffs of output, imports and the elasticity of import demand.

Model (10) is estimated for a set of 54 high, middle, and low income countries.⁶ For these countries

⁶They are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Korea, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Malawi, Malaysia, Peru, Phillipines, Poland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Morocco, Nepal, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Latvia, Pakistan, Romania, Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore

we have tariff data (incompletely) across 28 3-digit ISIC industries over the 1988-2000 period.⁷ Lower-middle income countries have fairly broad data coverage. Low-income countries have sufficiently available data for credible inferences about the model parameters.

Industry level output and trade data are from the World Bank's Trade and Production database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007). Import demand elasticities have been estimated for each country at the 6-digit HS level using a GDP function approach by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004).⁸ Since the standard errors of the elasticity estimates are known, they are treated as variables with measurement error and adjusted using a Fuller-correction (Fuller 1986; see also Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000).⁹ Since the four countries Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan and Taiwan do not have sufficient data to estimate import elasticities, for them we use the industry averages of the elasticity estimates for all other countries.

Estimates of the coefficient β_0 in (10), denoted 1/a, and its standard error are displayed in Table 1.1 for the 54 countries. Inverting these coefficients yield estimates of the parameter a. They appear in the last column of Table 1.1. Several interesting and surprising features of these estimates are evident in Table 1.2, where countries are sorted by their a estimates. In general richer countries have higher values of a than poorer countries. That is, governments of richer countries are revealed by their trade data to place a much greater weight on a dollar of welfare relative to a dollar of private gain (contributions) or private goods. The last two columns indicate that countries with a > 10 have OECD-level per capita incomes (with the exception of Brazil and Turkey). Middle income countries have fairly high values of a. All South American economies in our sample, with the exception of Bolivia (a = 0.68), fall within this group. Other notable liberalizers come from Asia: India (a = 2.72), Indonesia (2.62), Malaysia (3.13), Philippines (2.84). The lowest a's belong to the poor Asian countries Nepal (0.06), Bangladesh (0.16), Pakistan (0.74), and Sri Lanka (0.93), and the African nations Ethiopia (0.17), Malawi (0.25), Cameroon (0.30), and Kenya, (0.84).

⁷The tariff data are the applied Most-Favored-Nation rates from UNCTAD's Trains database. The 6-digit Harmonized System level data were mapped into the 3-digit ISIC industry level using filters available from the World Bank site www.worldbank.org/trade. Where possible, those data are augmented by WTO applied rates, constructed from the WTO's IDB and WTO's Trade Policy Reviews. The correlation between the two tariff series is above 0.93. Further, the direct and reverse regression coefficients are above 0.9, indicating that the errors in variables problem from mixing the two data sources is not a concern. Across the 40 countries, tariff data are available for an average of 7.2 years (minimum 2 and maximum 13).

⁸In this method imports are treated as inputs into domestic production, given exogenous world prices, productivity and endowments.

⁹The idea behind this correction is to limit the influence of estimates that are large and also have large standard errors. Without the correction, these large estimates would grossly overstate the true elasticity. The correction mutes their effect.

An important feature of our results is that, in contrast with previous examinations of the Grossman-Helpman model (Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000, Mitra et al. 2002, McCalman 2004, Eicher and Osang 2002), our estimates of a are reasonable, both qualitatively (poorer countries have smaller a's than richer countries) and quantitatively (only extremely low-tariff or zero-tariff countries like Hong Kong and Singapore have a's greater than 50, while this was routinely found for Turkey, Australia, and the U.S. in the studies referenced above). We find the cross-country variation in a to be striking and intuitively pleasing. Countries with low a's accord with the widely accepted view that governments in those countries are also among the most corrupt in the world. Indeed the Spearman rank correlation between Transparency International Perception Corruption Index for the year 2005 and our measure of government willingness to trade off social welfare for political rents is 0.67, and we can statistically reject the assumption that the two series are uncorrelated. In 2005 the Transparency International Corruption index rank of the two countries at the bottom of our a rankings (Nepal and Bangladesh) were 121 and 156 out of 157 countries, respectively. Similarly, the Transparency International Corruption index rank of the two countries at the top of our a rankings (Singapore and Taiwan) were 5 and 15, respectively.

Some results we find to be interesting surprises are (i) the low a for Mexico, despite it's membership in NAFTA, (ii) the lower than expected a for the OECD countries of Norway, Ireland and the Netherlands (in the $3 < a \leq 5$ group), (iii) the relatively high a's for the socialist countries in transition, including Poland, Hungary and Romania, (iv) the relatively high a's for Japan and China, both of whom have been criticized for being mercantilistic – protectionist and exportoriented.

These unexpected results emphasize the fact that the theoretical model does not base it's prediction simply on openness (low or high tariffs), but also the import-penetration ratio, and import demand elasticities, as well as their covariance with tariffs, and each other. The incidence of tariffs in industries with high import demand elasticities reveals the willingness on the part of governments to (relatively) easily trade public welfare for private gain,¹⁰ since Ramsey pricing in welfare-oriented countries dictates that the most price-sensitive goods should be distorted the least. The incidence of tariffs in industries with high import-to-output ratio also reveals the willingness on the part of those governments to trade public welfare for private gain since distorting prices in high-import sectors creates large deadweight losses. Empirically, this is not only revealed by the surprising estimates discussed above, but also by the relatively low correlation between our estimates of a, and average tariffs, which is estimated at 0.33, and compares badly with the correlation with the

¹⁰This results in a high estimate of β_0 and low estimates of a.

index of perceived corruption. Thus, the estimates underscore the need to consider more than simplistic measures of openness in order to make inferences about the terms at which different governments trade public welfare for private gain. The Grossman-Helpman measure is not only theoretically more appropriate, but also empirically, it appears to be quite distinct from simpler measures.

We are interested in the deeper question of why governments behave as they do. What explains the variation in the estimates of a across countries? Why do some countries have low a's and other high a's? Are polities in poorer countries content to let their governments cheaply trade their welfare away? If so, why? And why in richer countries do we observe the opposite? These are the questions to which we devote the remainder of the paper.

4. Explaining the variation in *a*: Theory

To explain why a varies across countries we delve into institutional foundations of policymaking. In this, we can take one of two routes. One is a data-mining approach that involves choosing a set of variables that adequately describe institutional details of the policy process in different countries, and use them to econometrically explain the cross-country variation in a. Such a method would shed light on those institutions that motivate governments to behave as they do in setting trade policy. The second is to seek structural explanations for the kind of institutional details that might explain the variation in a across countries. We opt for the latter in this paper, since it continues in the tradition of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model that delivered our estimates for a. Readers interested in the first approach may see Gawande, Krishna,Olarreaga (2007).

Positive theories that model policy outcomes based on institutional details of the policy process fall into three broad categories (Helpman and Persson 1999). Electoral models feature electoral competition between two candidates (or parties) and details about the structure of voter characteristics (informed versus uninformed) and voter preferences. Lobbying models feature details about the lobbying process (quid pro quo payments or informational lobbying). Legislative models feature specific legislative decision making processes that may emphasize, for example, agenda-setting and the allocation of policy jurisdictions (e.g. ministers, committee chairs). During the past decade the literature has taken important steps in integrating these approaches. That work provides the foundations for understanding the variation in a across countries.

4.1 Lobbying and Electoral Competition

Integrating lobbying and electoral competition has been done in three important models: Austen-Smith (1987), Baron (1994), and Grossman and Helpman (1996). They model policies as outcomes from the interaction of two parties and special interest groups that make lobbying contributions to them. They differ in the motives of the lobbyists. Lobbyists are purely interested in altering electoral outcomes in Austen-Smith and Baron. In Grossman and Helpman, in addition to the electoral motive, lobbyists are able to influence policy outcomes by altering party platforms via lobbying. We will abstract from the electoral motive and focus on this influence-seeking motive in order to connect the a parameter with more primitive institutional details. To this end, we describe the Grossman-Helpman (henceforth GH96) model.

In the GH96 model, there are two classes of voters, informed and uninformed. The former have immovable preferences based on (i) the policy position of each party and (ii) other characteristics of the party (liberal, conservative). Uninformed voters, on the other hand, may be induced to move from their current position by campaign expenditures by a party that is designed to impress them via slogans, advertising, and other informational devices. The difference in campaign spending by the two parties crucially determines how many uninformed voters they will be able to move to their side. For this reason, politicians representing each party demand contributions. Lobbies (comprising informed and uninformed voters) form to supply contributions. The model is one of proportional representation, but the results apply equally to a majoritarian system (GH96 p. 270).

We will consider the case, as in the GH94 model, where each sector is represented by a lobby, and the fraction of the organized population represent a negligible proportion of the total population. Each lobby is interested only in protecting its own sector, and thus there is no competition or conflict among lobbies.¹¹ The game comprises of two stages. In the first stage, lobbies announce their contribution schedules (as a function of the tariff afforded their sector), one to each of the two parties (party A and party B). In the second stage, the two parties choose their vector of tariffs (i.e. their policy platform) in order to maximize the representation of their party in the legislature (whether proportional or majoritarian). The lobbies then pay their promised contributions, the parties wage their campaigns, and the legislature/congress that assumes office implements one of the party's tariff vector.

¹¹This exemplifies Baron's (1994) idea of "particularistic policy" whose benefits are exclusively enjoyed by those who lobby for it, but the costs are not onerous on others.

A political microfoundation for a is found in the structural analog of the expression for the joint surplus in (5), which we replicate here.

$$\Omega_i = W_i(t_i) + aW(t_i), i = 1, \dots, n.$$

$$(11)$$

In the GH94 unitary government case, the politically optimal tariffs for the n sectors are determined, respectively, as separate Nash bargaining solutions to the n joint surpluses in (11). We will use the parallel between (11) and the bargaining solution to the electoral competition game (with one lobby) in order to establish links between a and parameters of the electoral competition game.

GH96 (p. 274 eq. (4)) show that the joint surplus in the electoral competition game involving parties A and B and one (say, sector i) lobby is

$$\Omega_i^K = \phi^K W_i(t_i) + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \quad \frac{f}{h} \quad W(t_i), \quad K = A, B.$$
(12)

As in (11), $W_i(t_i)$ is the (net of contributions) welfare of lobby *i*. In (12) $W(t_i)$ is the welfare of the average informed voter. There are four parameters to consider. ϕ^K is the probability that, once elections are over, the legislature actually adopts party K's trade policy platform (sector *i* tariff promised by party K before the election). Note that $\phi^A + \phi^B = 1$. α is the fraction of voters who are uninformed. If $\alpha = 0$, then $W(t_i)$ becomes the welfare of the average voter, just as in (11). f > 0 quantifies the diversity of views about the two parties among voters in terms of all fundamental characteristics (e.g. liberal-conservative) except their policy positions about the tariff t_i . The closer is f to zero the greater is the diversity of views; the larger is f the closer are the two parties perceived to be. h > 0 quantifies the ability of campaign spending to move the position of an uninformed voter. The greater is h, the more productive is a dollar of campaign spending in influencing the uninformed voter.

Predictions

Consider the probability of legislating party A's proposed tariff. Under proportional representation, ϕ^A is likely an approximately linear function of the proportion of seats won by party A. Under

a majoritarian system, however, ϕ^A may rise sharply as the share of seats exceeds 0.5. Thus, a majoritarian system may be expected to favor special interests more than a proportional system. That is, if party A wins a majority of seats, the weight ϕ^A on lobby *i*'s welfare W_i is likely to be higher in a majoritarian system than in a system of proportional representation.¹² Note that in the limit, if A wins all seats $\phi^A = 1$, and the weight on W_i is unity as in the unitary government case. Our first prediction is stated in the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: A majoritarian system favors special interests more than does a proportional system. Majoritarian systems are therefore associated with low a's.

Consider the fraction α of uninformed voters. A comparison of the weights on W in (11) and (12) indicates that, all else held constant, $a \to 0$ as $\alpha \to 1$. The intuition behind why the collective welfare of special interest groups receives greater weight as α increases also provides insight into the bargaining game with two parties. A party, say party A, can reject the lobby's offer, in which case it cannot court uninformed voters who would vote for party B (and who are only swayed by campaign spending). Thus, the party will choose a tariff designed to attract the maximum number of informed voters. That is, in (12) W_i receives no weight at all. Denote this tariff as t_i^* . To prevent this and to persuade party A to adopt a tariff t_i , lobby i must contribute an amount that delivers at least as many votes as would t_i^* .¹³ The larger is the proportion of uninformed voters α , the more pivotal the uninformed voter becomes. Since the resources for launching a campaign to sway uninformed voters are provided by lobby i, the lobby's welfare (here profits) gets greater weight in (12). This leads to a second prediction:

Hypothesis 2: The larger is the proportion of uninformed voters in the population, the lower is *a*, and conversely.

Consider the parameter f. The closer f is to zero, the greater is diversity of views among voters about the fundamental characteristics of the two parties. A comparison of the weights on W in (11) and (12) indicates that, all else held constant, $a \to 0$ as $f \to 0$. The reason why the collective welfare of special interest groups receives greater weight as f decreases is as follows. With a great diversity of views among voters, a tariff that deviates from that favored by the average voter does less damage electorally than when there is little diversity of views and the two parties are considered

¹²Similarly, if party B wins a majority of seats, the weight ϕ^B on lobby *i*'s welfare W_i is likely to be higher in a majoritarian system.

¹³GH96 (p.274) show that this is amount equals $\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{f}{h} [W(t_i^*) - W(t_i)].$

to be similar. In the latter case, a large number of voters are indifferent between the two parties (in terms of their basic characteristics), and a policy that deviates from t_i^* risks losing many voters to the other party. This leads to a third prediction:

Hypothesis 3: The greater is the perceived difference in the fundamental characteristics of the two parties in the eyes of voters, the lower is a, and conversely.

Finally, consider the productivity of campaign spending parameter h. A comparison of the weights on W in (11) and (12) indicates that, all else held constant, $a \to 0$ as $h \to \infty$. With greater power of the dollar to influence uninformed voters, it is less costly to deviate from t_i^* and hence the collective welfare of special interest groups receives greater weight relative to the public's welfare as h increases. This leads to our fourth and last prediction from the electoral competition model:

Hypothesis 4: The greater is the ability of a dollar of campaign spending to influence uninformed voters, the lower is *a*, and conversely.

4.2 Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining

The Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model has proved to be the workhorse in legislative bargaining. Models of legislative decision-making have had to struggle with Arrow's (1963) result that it is not possible to select the best action from a set of alternatives according to some voting rule (e.g. majority wins). The breakthrough has been the introduction of an *agenda setter* who is granted institutional power to champions a specific alternative and who attempts to guide voting in the direction of that agenda. Regardless of whether that agenda is selected over the status quo, a voting equilibrium exists (it may or may not be unique).¹⁴

Integrating lobbying with legislative bargaining has only recently begun. Unlike the GH96 model of lobbying and electoral competition, where a correspondence with (11) established political micro-foundations for a, there are few similar results in the lobbying and legislative bargaining literature. The literature to date has used government objective functions like (4), and taken a as given. The first hypothesis we develop will therefore rely on indirect linkages. We adapt Persson's (1998)

 $^{^{14}}$ Determining the set of alternatives from which the agenda setter selects forms the literature on "agenda formation" (e.g. Baron and Ferejohn 1987b). We will abstract from those issues and presume the agenda setter's agenda is admissible in the legislature.

legislative bargaining model of public goods provision to further our search for hypotheses about a. An attractive feature of the legislative bargaining model is that it allows us to link a with the asymmetric power of legislators. It also opens avenues for considering checks and balances that prevent extreme redistribution, which would result if those powers went unchecked.

To fix ideas, consider legislation of a slate of tariffs $\{t_i, i = 1, ..., n\}$. To make our point with simplicity, suppose the sectors are regionally concentrated and in each of the *n* districts is located one sector. Every district sends one representative to the legislature. However, there are exogenous institutional constraints on the amount of protection: the welfare loss from the set of tariffs/subsidies may not exceed a prespecified amount. This constraint may be satisfied by limiting the number of sectors that receive protection, or limiting the level of tariffs/subsidies, or both. Each legislator maximizes an objective function that is the sum of the welfare of the constituents in her district and the rents obtained from tariff policy.¹⁵ That is, a legislator cares specially about the rents from the tariff to her sector, over and above other components of welfare. There are two reasons for this assumption. One is that it is consistent with the existence of lobbies that pay the legislators for producing these rents. The other is votes, and the electoral competition model in which the money is used to get uniformed voters to vote for the legislator may be embedded here.

First, consider how the legislature sets the tariff vector when there are no lobbies. The legislative bargaining game follows a typical sequence of events: (1) A legislator is chosen to be an agenda setter S. (2) She makes a policy proposal $\{t_i^S\}$. (3) The legislature votes on the proposal, and if it gets simple majority t_i^S is implemented. Otherwise, the status quo outcome, say $\{t_i^o\}$, is implemented. The agenda setter is obviously interested in using her powers to benefit her district, but must obtain a majority that goes along with her tariff agenda $\{t_i^S\}$. She must therefore guarantee at least the same payoff to the legislators she courts as they would receive under the status quo. In the presence of the welfare loss constraint, she must sacrifice some rents that would have otherwise gone to her district in order to form a coalition of legislators that would implement her agenda. Persson shows that the agenda setter will set an agenda that forms a minimum winning coalition get no tariffs/subsidy even though they bear part of the welfare loss, (ii) the members of the winning coalition get just enough protection/subsidy that they are not worse off than in the status quo.¹⁶

¹⁵In Persson's (1998) model legislators may attach heterogeneous positive weights to a concave function of such rents. We will presume all legislators attach the same positive weight.

 $^{^{16}}$ If the weights on rents are heterogeneous across legislators, then a third condition applies: (iii) the members of the winning coalition are those that have the highest weights – that is, they are the cheapest to buy off.

The logic behind this stark, and somewhat pessimistic, result is that intense competition among legislators to be part of the winning coalition enables the agenda setter to dictate terms. This competition drives down the "price" (or weakens the terms) a legislator can charge the agenda setter. The agenda setter uses her powers to provide the highest rents possible to her district, since the competition among legislators allows her great bargaining power.

Lobbies

The same logic drives the results when we introduce lobbying into the game. Suppose every sector (district) has an organized lobby that makes contributions to their legislator. Their fierce desire to have their legislator be part of the winning coalition cedes any bargaining ability they may have to the agenda setter. Their contributions are unable to move the agenda in their favor. An interesting result in the lobbying game is that since no sector outside the district of the agenda setter receives any protection/subsidy, they contribute close to zero.¹⁷

It is notable that in the legislative bargaining model neither term-limits nor repeated elections of legislators can discipline the agenda setter. This is because individual voters, even retrospectively, can only affect local representation for the district, when they really desire influence at the national level.

Checks and Balances

Checks against the agenda setter's powers may be placed by an individual with influence over policy at the *national* level, say, a president. His policy platform consists of a specific limits on welfare losses from price distortions.¹⁸ Our exogenously specified limit on welfare loss is thus be motivated as a way of instituting checks and balances. Once again, the same conclusion applies – competition among legislators still enables the agenda setter to get away with what rents are possible. The difference is that the rents are lower, *if* the elected president's platform is more limiting than the status quo.¹⁹

¹⁷The model may be extended to incorporate the two-party electoral competition model in determining the legislator chosen to represent a district. Then, the diversity across districts in the parameters α , h, f, and ϕ then underlies each legislator's a parameter. This may well determine which legislators are in the winning coalition (that is, which are the cheapest for the agenda setter to buy off), but the fact still remains that competition among legislators will lead to the same policy.

¹⁸The legislative bargaining game now has two additional steps added to the front of the earlier sequence: xxx

¹⁹Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) give deeper meaning to what it means for the executive to wield checks and balances. Their mechanism is separation of powers. Further, separation of powers works to produce welfare-oriented

Clearly, a direct way of enhancing the bargaining power of legislators other than the agenda setter, and thus checking her powers, is via a binding limit on the rents the agenda setter can direct to her district. Such a national policy would then allow the legislative bargaining game to allocate rents to other districts. Regardless, both types of Presidential platforms – limits on the amount of total welfare loss, or limits to the rents accruing to the agenda setter's district – will result in a lower redistribution compared with a legislature that does not allow representation of a nationwide polity capable of checking legislators. We state the first hypothesis from the legislative bargaining game.

Hypothesis 5: To the extent that the executive represents voter interests, it will check the ability of legislators to impose their politically optimal welfare losses.

Our final two hypotheses go beyond the existing literature, and feature electoral competition for the executive. An unsatisfactory aspect of legislative bargaining theory is the presumption that the executive represents median voter interests, and thus satisfying a number of assumptions for the median voter result to hold (e.g. Black 1958). In most real-world democracies the executive is elected and lobbied. We therefore embed the two-party electoral competition game into the legislative bargaining model in order to draw a structural relationship between checks on the behavior of the agenda setter and the a parameter .

Electoral Competition for the Executive

Two candidates, representing parties A and B respectively, contest the Presidential election. The structure of the game is essentially similar to the game used to model electoral competition for legislative seats. The main difference here is that the presidential platforms concern not the tariff directly but limits on the total welfare loss from trade protection denoted \bar{L} . The executive is presumed to maximize an objective function like (4), except that the argument is \bar{L} (the set of tariffs t are determined conditional on \bar{L} , see fn xx below). When there are no lobbies, the executive seeks to maximizes national welfare and sets $\bar{L} = 0$ eliminating the possibility of any tariff or subsidy. Lobbies representing import-competing producers attempt to move \bar{L} away from zero so that they might benefit from tariffs, conditional on \bar{L} , that are decided in the legislative bargaining process.

The cap on welfare loss, \overline{L} , is determined as the outcome of the two-party election in which a *national*

outcomes only if no policy can be implemented unilaterally, i.e., without the consent of both bodies. Otherwise, there would be excessive (unilateral) claims on government resources at the expense of voters.

polity of informed and uninformed voters participate. Thus, \bar{L} for each of the two Presidential candidates is determined as the Nash bargaining solution to²⁰

$$\operatorname{Max}_{\bar{L}} \ \Omega_P^K = \phi_P^K \sum_i W_i(\bar{L}) + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \ \frac{f}{h} \ W(\bar{L}), \quad K = A, B,$$
(13)

where $W_i(\bar{L})$ is the (net of contributions) welfare of the lobby from district *i* and $W(\bar{L})$ is the welfare of the average informed voter, α is the fraction of uninformed voters, *f* quantifies the diversity of views about the two parties among voters, and *h* is productivity of campaign spending. ϕ_P is the probability that, once elected, the president is able to get the legislature to adopt \bar{L} .

The first result follows directly from (13). The parameter ϕ_P^K – the probability of successfully legislating candidate K's executive platform – determines the weight that special interests get in the executive electoral competition game. If ϕ_P^K is non-negative then the first term on the righthand side of (13) indicates that \bar{L} is selected to be greater than zero by both candidates. Thus, electoral competition with lobbies and uninformed voters induces both candidates to impose welfare loss on the national polity. The parameters α , h, f work to change a in the same direction as a result of electoral competition for the executive as they did with electoral competition for the legislature. We state this hypothesis as the next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6: Electoral competition for the executive is associated with lower values of a than if there were no competition for the executive.

Importantly, the parameter ϕ_P^K determines the executive's ability to impose checks on legislature's powers. When government is *undivided*, that is, when the executive and legislature both belong to the same party, the executive's platform is more likely to make it past the legislature than were government divided (see e.g. Elgie 2001). Thus, (13) implies that the higher is ϕ_P^K (undivided government), the more the executive platform of candidate K is bent to satisfying special interests at the expense of the public. Conversely, if ϕ_P^K is low (divided government), the executive is a source of checks on the legislature's ability to impose welfare costs on the public.²¹ We state this

 $^{^{20}}$ The logic behind (13) is similar to the logic behind (12) in the legislative electoral competition game.

²¹An opposite argument is advanced in Lohmann and OHallorans (1994). In their model a divided government does not delegate policymaking powers to the president, while a government with a clear majority in Congress does. Thus, under divided government trade policy should be more protectionist. The reason is that each legislator cares about private benefits and costs of protection to their own district and not the social costs. The social cost that individual

as our final hypothesis.²²

Hypothesis 7: Divided government leads to higher values of a than if the party of the executive were the same as the majority party in the legislature.

5. Explaining the variation in *a*: Data and Results

5.1: Data

Recent interest in the influence of institutions over economic and political outcomes has led to the creation of cross-country databases of political institution. We draw on the high-quality Database on Political Institutions (DPI) constructed by Beck et al. (2001). The database contains a number of variables measuring the nature of "government", "legislatures", "executive", and "Federalism". They are measured both, qualitatively and quantitatively, and serves our purpose admirably. They allow us to measure many of the variables required for testing our hypotheses. We also use economic data from various issues of the World Development Indicators (WDI). Media cost data are from World Advertising Trends (1998).

The theory upon which we base the empirical investigation requires us to consider only democracies.²³ We rely on the variable LIEC (Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness) in the DPI

$$\operatorname{Max}_{t_S} \quad \Omega_S^K = \phi_S^K W_S(t_S(\bar{L})) + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \quad \frac{f}{h} \quad W(t_S(\bar{L})), \qquad K = A, B.$$
(14)

 $W_S(t_S(\bar{L}))$ is the welfare of the district S lobby, $W(t_S(\bar{L}))$ is the welfare of the average informed voter in district S, and α, f, h are the same as the national-level parameters. ϕ^S is the probability that, once elected, the agenda setter is able to get the legislature to adopt t_S . Since ϕ_S determines how much weight special interests get in the electoral competition game in the agenda setter's district, it may be used to establishing a relationship between executive checks and a. In (13) ϕ_S is a function of the ceiling on the welfare loss \bar{L} , and if the constraint is binding, is *smaller* than if there were no national-level check on the agenda setter's powers. Thus, $\phi_S(\bar{L}) \leq \phi_S(\bar{L} = \inf)$. We can use this result to develop hypotheses about the agenda setter, but that would be largely theoretical exercise. Identifying agenda setters across our sample of countries is beyond the scope of our data. We leave this as an open comparative political economy question deserving further work.

²³A recent literature has argued in favor of democracies on the broader issue of whether democracies produce better

legislators impose in a divided Congress that is trapped into distributive logrolling, leads to inefficiently high levels of protection. Further, under divided government, the presidents discretionary powers are more constrained therefore associating divided governments with higher levels of protection and majority government with freer trade.

²²The legislative bargaining theory may completed as follows: In the agenda setter's district, two candidates compete to become the agenda setter. Their platforms, consisting of the tariff for their district t_S (conditional on the executive's limit on welfare loss that may be nationally imposed by trade policy \bar{L}) that they propose to push through the legislature, are determined as the Nash bargaining solution to

database to identify democracies. LIEC scores vary between 1 (no legislature) and 7(largest party received less than 75% of the seats). Lower scores are given to unelected legislatures (score=2) or if the legislature is elected but comprises just one candidate (score=3) or just one party (score=4). Countries with scores of 4 or less are not considered to have legislatures featuring electoral competition. Only countries in which multiple parties contested for seats in the legislature (scores of 5 or more) are considered in the sample. Among the 54 countries for which we have estimated the parameter a, only four are dropped on this count (China, Hong Kong, Ethiopia, Taiwan).²⁴

Testing Hypothesis 1, requires identifying legislatures elected using a proportional system of representation – where seats are allocated on the basis of the proportion of votes received – versus a pluralitarian first-past-the-post systems.²⁵ The variable HOUSESYS in the DPI is used to identify countries with proportional versus pluralitarian systems. HOUSESYS is coded 1 in the DPI only if the majority of the house is elected on a plurality basis. We define the binary variable PROPORTIONALITY=1-HOUSESYS to indicate legislatures in which parties are (largely) represented proportionally to the votes they receive.²⁶

We must reconcile the theoretical model, which admits only two parties, with the presence in our data of many countries with multi-party governments. The probability of successfully legislating the platform of the party in power *is* the basis for the prediction that greater protectionism will

trade policy oucomes than non-democracies. Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that democratization reduces the ability of governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for gaining political support. The reason is that democratization implies a movement towards majority rule rather than leaders representing small groups. Using an elegant and simple trade model they show that the optimal level of protectionism declines with the size of the winning coalition. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000 and 2002) also argue that democracies are more likely to adopt trade policies that reflect voters interests rather than the interest of a small group of pressure groups, but for a different reasons. In a world with asymmetric information where voters cannot distinguish perfectly between economic shocks (over which leaders have little control) and deliberate extractive policies, trade agreements aid leaders in signaling their actions to home voters, since their partners in the trade agreement will hold them up to their actions.

 $^{^{24}}$ Taiwan had an LIEC score of 2 during the early 1990s, the period from which we used data to estimate its a.

 $^{^{25}}$ The influence of proportional versus other systems of electing legislatures has been well-researched in the context of protection. Mansfield and Busch (1995) found that during the 1980s countries with proportional systems had higher nontariff barriers than countries with majoritarian system. Willmann (2005) suggests that this might be so because a districts in majoritarian systems select more protectionist representatives than their median voters. Hatfield and Haulk (2004) show the opposite – that during 1980-2000, Latin American and OECD countries with proportional systems had lower tariffs than countries with majoritarian system. Evans (2008) affirms this finding using data for nearly 150 countries during 1981-2004.

²⁶The DPI contains the variable PR that takes the value 1 if *any* candidates are elected based on the proportion of votes received by their party and 0 otherwise. Even a small fraction the legislature is elected using both, then PR is coded 1. Another variable PLURALITY does similarly for pluralitarian systems. A problem with using either of these measures is that a number of countries have PR=PLURALITY=1, indicating the presence of both systems. Coding according to HOUSESYS is cleaner and leads to a measure that is either proportional or pluralitarian, but not both.

likely prevail under a majoritarian system (greater probability of legislative success) than under a proportionate system (lower probability). In a government comprising more than one party and/or an opposition that also comprises a coalition of parties, the probability of successfully legislating the winning party's platform requires consideration of party concentration and cohesiveness (see e.g. McGillivray 1997).²⁷.

We extend the hypothesis about proportionate versus majoritarian systems by interacting PRO-PORTIONAL and (1-PROPORTIONAL) with Herfindahl indices of party concentration in the government (HERFGOV) and opposition (HERFOPP). We define the difference GOVCOHESION = HERFGOV - HERFOPP to measure party cohesion in the government relative to the opposition. The greater is HERFDIFF, the more cohesive is the government coalition; the smaller is HERFD-IFF, the more fractured the government and/or the more united the opposition. We use the two interactions, PROP+GOVCOHESION = PROPORTIONAL × HERFDIFF and PLUR+GOVCOHESION = (1-PROPORTIONAL) × HERFDIFF, to test the idea that plurality *plus* party cohesion in government (relative to the opposition) leads to greater success in legislative voting than proportionality *plus* party cohesion within the government.

Hypothesis 1.2: A majoritarian system with cohesion among parties in power favors special interests more (i.e. have lower a's) than does a proportional system with the same party cohesion.

At the heart of electoral competition models of this genre is the fraction α of uninformed voters. Thus, testing the relationship between uninformed voters and a (Hypothesis 2) is also a test of the relevance of the Baron's (1994) uninformed voter construct in general. The general hypothesis is that the greater is the proportion of voters that are uninformed, the greater is the divergence of policy from the one that satisfies the median voter. We will test this specifically in the instance of trade policy.

We capture two different dimensions of what it means for voters to be "uninformed". Essentially, in the Grossman-Helpman model (and in the Baron model upon which it is based) uninformed voters are impressionable voters who do not know the policy positions of candidates. We will capture the idea of uninformed voters as impressionable voter, using two variables. The first variable is the proportion of the population that is illiterate (ILLITERACY), which directly measures a part of

²⁷In order to admit more than 2 parties, we assume that each party uses its platform to seeks absolute majority in the legislature. The platform may not be bent to "buy in" coalition partners ex ante. The largest winning party's platform may be bent after the coalition forms in legislature, but the platform evetually supported is closer to the winning party than the platform of the (largest party in the) opposition

the population whose opinions are more vulnerable to campaign spending. There is some evidence that lower literacy is associated with being uninformed politically, even in developed countries. A primary survey by Blais et al. (2000, Table 1) of Canadian voters indicated that high school dropouts indicated not knowing about a large proportion of high-profile political candidates, relative to those who had completed university. In developing countries this problem is worse. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) add that political capture by lobbies in developing countries is increasing in (i) the average level of political awareness, and (ii) the disparity in awareness levels across economic classes. These, in turn are correlated with illiteracy and poverty.

The second variable is the proportion of the population that is urbanized (URBANIZATION). It captures two ideas. One is the well-documented evidence in both, developed and developing countries, that rural voters are likely to be less informed than urban voters. In Majumdar, Mani and Mukand (2004) information discrepancy between rural and urban populations is the reason why urban areas get more than a disproportionate share of public goods. Rural residents are poorly positioned to ascertain the relative importance of government neglect versus exogenous shocks in bringing about a low output in rural areas.²⁸ Active media and better education make the urban population less easy to fool. A government will therefore expend resources in generating more favorable urban outcomes, despite the fact that they are outnumbered by their rural populations. Majumdar et al. present striking facts about the information divide (measured by newspaper readership, and per capita radio and television ownership) between the rural versus urban populations in Nepal, Pakistan, India and Philippines. Their Table 1 especially starkly documents the difference in literacy rates in the poorer Asian and Latin American countries. Thus, while the variable URBANIZATION captures the intra-country differences in informed versus uninformed voters.²⁹

Information externalities are another reason why densely populated urban areas are naturally positioned to obtain information (Stromberg 2004). Scale economies afforded by urban agglomeration support an explosion of radio stations, TV channels, and newspapers, while the smaller and more

²⁸Government response to weather shocks in the China and the US are two divergent examples of information conditioning public opinion. Despite the poor government response to weather shocks in February 2008 in China, the (generally less informed) Chinese population blamed the weather more than their government. The more informed population of the US were much less forgiving of their government for their laxity during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

²⁹Dutt and Mitra's (2002) findings suggest that inequality can work both ways: an increase in inequality raises trade barriers in capital-abundant economies and lowers them in capital-scarce economies. Since URBANIZATION and ILLITERACY are both positively correlated with inequality, this finding suggests we should find evidence for or against this hypothesis.

scattered rural populations are eluded these scale economies. The news barrage that accompanies elections is more likely to sway the rural population unused to the blitz than the more habituated urban population.

The diversity of views about characteristics of the parties other than their trade policy positions (the parameter f in Hypothesis 3) is measured by a variable LRDIVIDE that indicates the Left-Right divide between the largest party in government and the largest party in opposition.³⁰ It takes the value 1 if the former leans Left or Right and the latter leans the other way. If both lean the same way, or if either party is centrist, then the two sides are not considered to be ideologically polarized, and LRDIVIDE takes the value 0. If extra-issue characteristics are strong in the minds of voters, then they will not turn away from their preferred parties even when those parties distort policies and impose welfare losses on them. The left-right divide engenders strong priors and ideal positions in the minds of voters, thus capturing this central idea behind Proposition 3.³¹

We measure the (inverse of) the productivity of campaign spending parameter h in Proposition 4 by advertising expenditures scaled by GDP in 1996, using data on media costs from World Advertising Trends (1998). Missing data were supplemented from Euromonitor (2004, 2008).³² Since it measures the number of advertising dollars spent in order to "generate" a country's GDP, or net sales, the advertising expenditure-to-GDP ratio measures the (average) inverse productivity of advertising expenditures. Since TV advertising comprises a large fraction of advertising expenditures, accounting for between 30% and 60% for most countries in the sample, we employ the variable TVADVERTISING_GDP = TV advertising spending scaled by GDP.³³ We also constructed the variable TOTALADVERTISING_GDP = Total advertising spending on all media - including newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV - scaled by GDP. The results using this more encompassing (though less complete variable due to missing data) measure were similar. The (inverse)

³⁰In the DPI they are, respectively, FGOVRLC and FOPPRLC.

³¹Dutt and Mitra (2005) find that left-wing governments adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital-rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor-rich countries, than right-wing governments. Our theory does not make this subtler distinction, and so we do not interact LRDIVIDE with the capital-labor ratio, but this extension is worth exploring theoretically and empirically in future research.

 $^{^{32}}$ An ideal measure of advertising cost is the price per 30-second advertisement divided by the viewership, or the cost of a commercial per viewer. Stratmann (2007) is able to approach such a measure within the US and finds evidence that advertising spending is not the same as advertising viewership. Measuring viewership reach by each candidate's advertising dollars, Stratmann finds that more viewership positively influences election chances. However, the viewership measure is not available at the scope of our set of countries, and we use a proxy for this ideal measure.

³³Prat and Stromberg (2007) document the Swedish experience before and after the entry of commercial TV. They find that people who started watching commercial TV news increases their level of political knowledge more than those who did not, and also increased their political participation. They coclude that commercial TV news attracts ex ante uniformed voters.

productivity of campaign spending is thus measured by these (inverse) productivity of advertising variables, the assumption being that most of the campaign money is used to sway uninformed voters via media blitzes.

The variable CHECKS in the DPI is used to measure executive checks and balances on the powers of legislators (Hypothesis 5). CHECKS takes integer values between 1 (Indonesia and Mauritius in our sample) and 15 (India).³⁴ The theory presumes that the executive is presumed to represent the interests of the median voter, and is therefore a restraining influence on the agenda setter. The variable CHECKS answers the question of whether this is true in the data. Since CHECKS grades according to the propensity of the system to duel the legislature on issues, it is a more sophisticated measure than required by the theory. We therefore experiment with a binary reduction of CHECKS (BinaryCHECKS) which simply measures the existence of checks, as required by the theory.³⁵

The dilution in the ability of the executive to champion a stringent platform of support for the median voter when they themselves require monetary help from special interests to win elections (Hypothesis 6) requires measurement of executive electoral competition. The DPI variable EIEC (executive index of electoral competition) is well-suited for this purpose. EIEC varies between 1 and 7, where 1 indicates no executive and 7 indicates the most severe competition in executive elections. In our sample EIEC=2 for two countries (Indonesia and Mauritius) specifying unelected executive, EIEC=6 for three countries (Egypt, Romania, and Singapore) specifying that candidates from more than one party contested and the largest party received more than 75% of the votes, EIEC=7 for all others specifying that candidates from more than one party contested and the votes. We also experiment with a binary version of EIEC (BEIEC) where BEIEC=0 if EIEC<7, and BEIEC=1 if EIEC=7.

³⁴The variable CHECKS equals one for countries the executive is not competitively elected . CHECKS is incremented by one if there is a chief executive. CHECKS is further incremented by one if the chief executive is competitively elected. CHECKS is then incremented by one if the opposition controls the legislature. In presidential systems, CHECKS is incremented by one (i) for each chamber of the legislature (unless the presidents party has a majority in the lower house and a closed list system is in effect. A closed list system implies stronger presidential control of her party, and therefore of the legislature, and (ii) for each party coded as allied with the presidents party and which has an ideological (left-right-center) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the presidents party. In parliamentary systems, CHECKS is incremented by one (i) for every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, and (ii) for every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues (right-left-center) closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive.

³⁵de Figueiredo (2002) finds that in political systems with high turnover, parties are likely to cooperate over policy rather than change policy while in power. Since political turnover is likely to be high when BinaryCHECKS equals 1, our interpretation of his result is that executives are able to maintain checks especially if government is fractured.

The final hypothesis, about divided government (Hypothesis 7), measures a specific source of checks on the powers of the legislature. We measure divided government with two variables. The first, ALLHOUSE from the DPI, indicates whether the party of the executive has absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers. If so, ALLHOUSE takes the value 1, otherwise government is divided and the variable takes the value 0. The second variable, ESIMILARITY, measures whether the executive and the largest party in government are ideologically similar. It takes the value 1 if, when the executive is Leftist or Rightist or Centrist, the largest government party also leans similarly. Otherwise, government is divided and ESIMILARITY takes the value 0. Perhaps surprisingly, the two variables are uncorrelated in our sample. We note that the variable CHECKS, used to measure control of the legislature by the executive, also subsumes the case of divided government. In fact, the empirical correlation between ALLHOUSE and CHECKS is approximately -0.50. To some extent, therefore CHECKS, ALLHOUSE and ESIMLARITY are all legitimate measures of divided government.

5.2: Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables just describerd from the sample of fifty democracies. The dependent variable we will use is the log of the estimated *a*'s. Its outstanding characteristic is that it satisfies normality and is therefore outlier-free. This is a useful property, since small clusters of observations can no longer overly influence the outcome of the regression.

About half the sample uses a primarily proportionate system of representation in the legislature, and half primarily use plurality. The sample mean for ILLITERACY is 13.4% and for URBANIZATION is 61.7%. Both variables have considerable variation across the sample. 36% of the countries in the sample have ideologically widely divided legislature (LRDIVIDE). The average spending on TV advertising per dollar of GDP varies from .003 cents (very productive) to 6.867 cents (unproductive), with an average of 2.1 cents. In only two countries are there stringent checks on the legislature by the executive (BinaryCHECKS=1). In 90% of the sample, the executive faces electoral competition (BEIEC=1). In 46% of the sample government is politically undivided (ALLHOUSE), while in 80% of the sample government is ideologically undivided (ESIMILARITY=1).

The central empirical results are presented in Table 3.³⁶ A concern with using the estimated a's

 $^{^{36}}$ We will maintain the exogeneity of all regressors on the grounds that they are unrelated to the error term of the regression. That is, shocks to *a* do not "cause" changes in any of these variables. This is in keeping with a basic premise of our inquiry, as in the literature to date on institutions as a source of the quality of policy outcomes, that institutions pre-date and determine outcomes. To the extent there is stasis in institutions, they are exogenous.

as the dependent variable is that it has extreme values, implying the existence of outliers. For example, a is estimated at 404.0 for Singapore but the next highest is only 37.8 (Japan). Indeed, the Shapiro-Wilk (1965) test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the a's came from a normally distributed population. In Table 3 we therefore present two sets of estimates, one in which the dependent variable is the log of a and the other in which the dependent variable is a Box-Cox transformation of a (conditional on regressors). The former downplays the role of extreme values while the latter seeks a transformation that approximates a normal distribution. The tests reported at the bottom of the table indicates that $\ln(a)$ satisfies normality, and so do the errors. Further, the Box-Cox model estimates in the last two columns are quantitatively close to those of the OLS estimates in the first two columns. This is not surprising in retrspect, since the Box-Cox transformation yields an approximately log-distribution, $.3^7$ The adjusted R-squareds attest to the adequate fit on the models. We turn now to testing the seven hypotheses.

Contrary to the literature on proportionality versus plurality as sources of diverse policy outcomes, we find that this choice has no influence on governments' welfare-mindedness. The interaction of proportionality with cohesion in the legislature does have a positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that proportionality *plus* a legislature in which the ruling parties are fewer in number than the opposition leads to a greater concern for welfare. But so is the coefficient on the interaction of plurality with cohesion in the legislature, Further, their sizes are statistically the same, indicating that legislative cohesion, not proportionality or plurality, is the driving force behind the result. Thus, both hypotheses (H1 and H1B) that proportionality-based systems deliver better outcomes for the average citizen than pluralitarian systems are rejected.

Since ILLITERACY and URBANIZATION measure voter informativeness, they serve to test the central presumption of electoral competition theory that attracting the votes of uninformed voters make policy platforms responsive to special interest money. The centrality of uninformed voting has strong empirical backing. Both their coefficients are statistically significant in the expected directions. Even more important, they are politically and economically significant. The coefficients imply that an increase in illiteracy of 0.10 decreases a by 27.59%, and an increase in urbanization of 0.10 increases a by 38.21%. Hypothesis H2 – a's relationship with the proportion of voters that are uninformed – is thus strongly validated. These results suggest that the source of the divide

Certainly, institutions react to poor outcomes but the ability to do so is conditioned on other institutions more than the source of the shock (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003)

 $^{^{37}}$ That is, the Box-Cox parameter θ reported in the table is close to zero.

noted in Table 1.2 between poor and rich countries is that it is because their populations are mostly rural and their literacy rates are low that less developed countries have lower a's.

Hypothesis H3 is also strongly affirmed. The greater the ideological divide between parties contesting for the legislature, the lower is a. All else constant, a country with contesting parties that are ideologically close (LRDIVIDE=0) has an a that is 74.6% higher than in a country with parties that are ideologically far apart (LRDIVIDE=1). Thus, the larger their unshakeable voter base the more their platforms cater to special interests, since the parties do not fear losing voters over trade policy contests.

The estimates affirm hypothesis H4 about the productivity of expenditures to sway voters. We find that the more cost-effective is each TV advertising dollar, the less welfare-oriented is government. That is, if an advertising dollar is able to convert many (uninformed) voters, then economic logic dictates more advertising dollars are spent. Since lobbies are the source of the supply of advertising dollars, policy platforms are pushed in their direction. The quantitative impact is notable. The results show that a decrease in TVADVERTISING_GDP by 1 (that is, a decrease in TV advertising revenue of 1 dollar per thousand dollars of GDP) raises *a* by 21.4%. This finding has implications for the difference in the welfare-mindedness of developed versus developing countries. Since developing countries have much lower ratios of TVADVERTISING_GDP than developed countries, more productive media dollars (combined with greater proportion of voters that are uninformed) are another reason why their governments are less welfare minded.³⁸

Turning to the legislative bargaining hypotheses, both measures of checks and balances (CHECKS in the first OLS model and BinaryCHECKS in the second) are positive and statistically significant. An increase in CHECKS of one standard deviation (around 2) is associated with a 30.6% increase in a, all else constant.³⁹ In most countries CHECKS fall in the 1-7 range, with India as the sole extreme data point with a score of 15. The India observation may therefore be influential in determining the regression coefficient on CHECKS. Recoding the India value to, say 8 or 9, does not alter the statistical or political significance of CHECKS (the coefficient is larger though less precise).

³⁸In Morocco, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Pakistan, Bolivia, India, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Egypt, Romania, Kenya, Turkey, and Malawi this ratio is less than 1, indicating advertising is many times cheaper per dollar of GDP than in developed countries like Japan and the US.

³⁹While simple correlation of both CHECKS with $\ln(a)$ is negative, its partial correlation is positive, indicating that this result may on itself to correlations among of CHECKS with other regressors. We investigate this further in a sensitivity analysis.

When BinaryCHECKS = 1, it indicates a government that is quite fractured so that the executive is quite powerful (that is, the ability of the executive to check the powers of the legislature are magnified – see fn xx). This definition of the binary Checks variable gives the best chance for the theory to perform, rather than one where the executive is defined to be only marginally powerful. The theory holds up well. The estimates imply that, all else equal, countries with effective checks by the executive (BinaryCHECKS=1) have a welfare-for-lobbying tradeoff that is 180.9% more expensive than countries without checks. This affirmation of the idea that the executive can effectively wield checks on the ability of the legislature to sell out is all the more remarkable considering that BinaryCHECKS=1 for only two countries – India and Pakistan.

If the executive must face electoral competition, then the same forces that came into play in shaping the platforms of legislators also come into play here. Since special interests now wield influence over the platforms of candidates for the executive, electoral competition reduces the welfare-mindedness of the executive. The results strongly affirm this mechanism. Both, the executive index of electoral competition EIEC and its binary version BinaryEIEC are statistically and politically significant. BinaryEIEC indicates that, all else equal, a country in which the executive does not face competition at the polls has an a that is 157.6% more than a country whose executive does. The finer measure EIEC indicates that an increase in the index of 1 unit (approximately one standard deviation) lowers a by 36.8%. This extension to the legislative bargaining literature is new and imparts a real-world feel to the model. The office of the executive is, more often than not, a competitive selection.

Undivided government does not appear to have any impact on a after controlling for the other variables. To be fair to theoretical literature on divided governments, the electoral competition variables CHECKS and BinaryCHECKS are also good measures of the incidence and extent of divided government. The high correlation between ALLHOUSE and CHECKS of -0.50 also empirically affirms that CHECKS picks up the effect of divided government. The aforementioned findings about these two variables imply that divided government causes lowers a's, in keeping with our theory (and other mechanisms in the literature that show that divided governments can cause good policy outcomes). If CHECKS and BinaryCHECKS really are measures of divided government rather than measures of the ability of the executive to impose checks, in order to test the basic precept of the legislative bargaining theory (hypothesis H5), we would need a sample in which some countries have no (elected or unelected) executive, only a legislature. Unfortunately, our sample has no such cases and does not allow that experiment. A number of hypotheses about institutions and the *a* parameter were tested using the estimates in Table 2. Which of those influences is strongest? Table 3 reports unit-free beta coefficients that may be used to compare the influence of the variables. These coefficient simply indicate the number of standard deviations that the dependent variable changes if an independent variable is increased by one standard deviation. As such, this measure favors the size of the coefficient over its statistical precision. URBANIZATION has the largest influence on *a*, making the uninformed voter hypothesis stand out among the hypotheses as an important force behind *a*. ILLITERACY is influential as well, lending more credence to the uninformed voter model. Other variables that are influential are the same variables that stood out as being statistically significant in Table 2. The statistically insignificant coefficients are imprecise, but also small.

Sensitivity Analysis

We report the results from a set of stress tests we have conducted in order to investigate the robustness (or fragility) of the inferences made thus far. Although the dependent variable $\ln(a)$ passed the test of normality (implying the absence of outliers) we re-estimated the models using a robust estimator based on minimizing a weighted sum of squared errors, where large outliers are given smaller weights according to Tukey's criterion. Not surprisingly, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. These are reported in Table 5.

Since the *a* parameters were estimated, and their standard errors are known, we performed a weighted regression with weights inversely proportional to the squares of the standard errors. In other words, this is simply a heteroskedastic regression using information about the estimated variance of $\ln(a)$.⁴⁰ These results are reported in the last two columns of Table 6. There are some notable differences from what we have seen thus far. The coefficient on ILLITERACY is no longer as precisely estimated, and has the opposite sign. Neither CHECKS nor Binary CHECKS are statistically significantly different from zero. However, ALLHOUSE is now statistically and politically significant, preserving our inference about divided government which was based on CHECKS and Binary CHECKS. Finally, ESIMILARITY is positive and statistically significant. These result deserve expplaining.

The a's are more tightly estimated for developed countries, and therefore these regressions put

⁴⁰The standard errors of $\ln(a)$ were computed using the delta method. Note that the heteroskedastic regression presumes that the only source of error is the measurement error in $\ln(a)$.

greater weights on developed countries. Since their populations have high literacy rates, ILLITER-ACY has low variance in the sub-sample of developed countries, and loses its statistical significance. The coefficients on CHECKS and BinaryCHECKS are not significant for the same reason. However, ALLHOUSE has considerable variance in the sub-sample, which enables a more precise estimation of its influence. The estimate implies that, all else equal, if the party of the executive also controls the House (ALLHOUSE=1)then a is 65.1% lower than if government were politically undivided (model M1). Contrary to what we imagined, ideological similarity between the executive and the leading political party in government has the converse effect. If the executive and largest party in the legislature are ideologically *similar* (ESIMILARITY=1) then a is 92.8% *higher* than otherwise. It appears that politically divided government has very different implications for the behavior of governments than ideological divisions.⁴¹ Political division produces outcomes that are welfareoriented while ideological division is adversarial. We note that the two variables are uncorrelated in the data.

In a widely cited paper Levine and Renelt (1992) critiqued the empirical literature on economic growth for producing what were actually quite fragile inferences. A root cause of the fragility in cross-country regressions are (conditional) correlations among the regressor variables. As a result, a particular combination of regressors may yield a striking and significant coefficient on a variable, but other combinations may fail to come up with any result of note. The Levine-Renelt sensitivity analysis consists of choosing a focus variable and a group of regressors that are relevant to the regression, and estimating as many regressions as there are subsets of those regressors (with kregressors there are 2^k possible subsets). The highest and lowest coefficient estimates on the issue variable from these regressions is then reported. If the maximum and minimum have the same sign (and are statistically significant), it is strong evidence of robustness to the choice of regressors. We perform a similar exercise but use a softer stick to judge the results. The results are reported in Table 7.

Consider the issue variable PROPORTIONAL, and the eight other regressors ILLITERACY, URBANIZATION, LRDIVIDE, TVADVERTISING_GDP, CHECKS, EIEC, ALLHOUSE, ESIM-ILARITY. Using these eight we choose the 212 combinations comprising of one regressor variable (8 combinations), two regressor variables (28), three regressor variables (56), and four regressor

⁴¹The Lohmann-O'Halloran conclusion that undivided government leads to better welfare, while not validated by the measures of politically undivided government ALLHOUSE and CHECKS, is validated by the measure of ideologically undivided government ESIMILARITY.

variables (70).⁴² We conduct two types of robustness. The first, TYPE A Robustness, is a soft test asking whether *any* among the one-, two-, three- or four-variable combinations produces maximum and minimum estimates on PROPORTIONAL so that both have the sign and both are statistically significant at 10%. We conclude that PROPORTIONAL does not produce any robust inferences at all. This may not come as any surprise considering the low level of precision with which it was estimated in the first place. But do the coefficients that were estimated with statistical significance hold up to the Type A robustness check? ILLITERACY, URBANIZATION, TVADVERTISING_GDP, and BinaryEIEC do. To some extent, so do LRDIVIDE, CHECKS, BinaryCHECKS, and EIEC. For example, LRDIVIDE produces robust inferences with any three or four of the eight regressors.

Type B Robustness indicates whether the interval for each issue variable constructed from the full set of 212 regressor combinations contains zero (and is therefore not robust). Since the bounds for ILLITERACY are both negative and statistically significant, we conclude that the inference about the fraction of uninformed voters is strongly robust to choice of regressors. Thus, ILITERACY, URBANIZATION, TVADVERTISING_GDP and BinaryEIEC provide robust Type B inferences. LRDIVIDE, CHECKS, BinaryCHECKS, EIEC provide inferences in which one of the bounds has an absolute t value less than 1.6, and is therefore poorly measured. The inferences we have made from those coefficients are not as robust to the choice of regressors. In the adjacent column are indicated variables whose inclusion undermines the inferences from an issue variable. It appears that inclusion of the variables ILITERACY, URBANIZATION, and TVADVERTISING_GDP weaken the ability of many other variables to provide clear independent inferences. These variables obviously capture a number of influences inherent in the issue variables, so that the partial correlation of the issue variables with the dependent variable $\ln(a)$ is lowered once they are included. A lesson from this exercise is that it is possible to generate a set of results from a specific regression, but if empirical results are to move theory forward, they must demonstrate robustness. Thus, our earlier inferences about hypotheses H2 (uninformed voting), H4 (productivity of media) and H6 (executive electoral competition) are robust, while those about H3 (ideological attachment) and H5 (executive checks) are fragile. The way forward empirically is to construct better measures of ideological attachment and executive checks. Another is to increase the sample to test these theories, which requires trade, protection, and output data for more countries.

 $^{^{42}}$ We could choose more than four, making it a stiffer test to pass, but the 212 combinations provide a fair idea of robustness to choice of regressors. PROP+LEGCOHESION and PLUR+LEGCOHESION are included in every regression.

A Rawlsian Extension

Thus far, we have committed ourselves to a world in which government welfare is a weighted sum of special interest money and public welfare. Rawlsian logic would predict that governments also care about maintaining a fair living standard for all, especially lower income workers. There is some evidence that this is the case (Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Magee 2002; cite other empirical Rawlsian studies here xxx). While that evidence is relavant, it is exploratory and not based on formal models. In order to incorporate equity considerations, we must start with an objective function that reflects Rawls' Difference Principle in addition to the role of special interests. While that task is beyond the scope of this paper, we take liberties with the structure and imagine that such a model predicts the following extension of (10):

$$\frac{t_{it}}{1+t_{it}} \cdot e_i \cdot \frac{M_{it}}{X_{it}} = \frac{1}{a^R} + X\Phi + \epsilon_{it} \qquad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

$$(15)$$

In (15) the new vector X controls for public-interest motives of the government. The coefficient on the constant yields the new estimate of (the inverse of) a, termed a^R . We estimate three versions of (15), one in which X includes average worker wage (in industry *i* at time *t*), another in which X includes average worker wage plus average worker productivity (measured as output per worker), and a third model in which X includes average worker wage scaled by the country's per capita income. Estimates of the *a*'s from these three models are presented in Table A1.⁴³ For most countries the additional regressors push the estimates of *a* downward, sometimes strikingly. The US estimate, for example, declines from over 26 to less than 7, and similar declines are seen in a number of developed countries. The addition of the Rawlsian regressors suggests that if the portion of tariffs used to protect worker incomes is separated from the portion of tariffs that responds to special interest contributions, then countries are shown to be much more responsive to special interests. This is not always the case, and the *a*'s for Nepal, Bangladesh, Malawi, Cameroon, Costa Rica, and India actually increase as a result of the additional variables.

Do our inferences change with the new a's? In Table 8 are reported estimates from the electoral competition and legislative bargaining models. The uninformed voters hypothesis, the ideological attachment hypothesis, and the productivity of media spending hypothesis continue to be affirmed

⁴³Missing data on the additional variables precludes estimates for Pakistan, Romania and Brazil.

with all three sets of new a's. However, CHECKS and BinaryCHECKS no longer may be used to support the hypothesis about executive electoral competition (or about divided government), and EIEC and BinaryEIEC no longer support the hypothesis of executive electoral competition. The legislative bargaining model faces empirical rejection if these are the correct a's. We should, however, be reminded that the empirical specification (15) used to estimate the new a's is still ad hoc. The idea of structural estimation espoused in this paper emphasizes theory-based estimation, and before the results in Table 8 may be used for testing theory, they must be predicted by such theory. Until then they must be considered ad hoc. The new estimates of a are nevertheless interesting, and estimates of parameters of (15) suggests that work on the theoretical foundations that may admit explanatory variables like wage and productivity should prove worthwhile.

Finally, Table A2 in the shows there are noteworthy differences in inferences about government's welfare-mindedness that may be made using tariff data directly, and using estimates of a as we have done. The first two columns of estimates are replicated from Table 3. The next two columns are estimates of the same coefficients but from an econometric model with (import-weighted) tariffs as the dependent variable. The last two columns use the log of import-weighted tariffs as the dependent variable. The model with tariff data support the uninformed voters hypothesis and the model of executive checks and balances (or divided government to the extent CHECKS measures it), but no other. The model with log tariffs weakly support the uninformed voters hypothesis, and the dilution of executive powers once they are subject to electoral competition. but no others. Our "roundabout" method of first estimating a's and then investigating its determinants supplies theoretically grounded inferences. In our view it is the more direct and relevant method for assessing the fundamental question of why governments behave as they do.

6. Conclusion

This paper has studied quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments, having observed government behavior through the lens of trade policy determination. Our analysis suggests a very substantial variation in government behavior in the cross-section of (over fifty) countries that we have studied. The variation broadly matches our *a priori* beliefs regarding the weight governments put on social welfare relative to industry lobbying in their policy decisions. They are also consistent with the Transparency International perception index of corruption.

More importantly, the determinants of this variation were studied structurally. That is, theories

consistent with the one used to estimate welfare-mindedness of governments were used to understand why some countries care more about the welfare of their citizens than others. These theories suggest specific political, economic, and institutional variables as fundamental determinants of the variation in the behaviors of governments. Using a new database on political institutions we empirically test whether these variables influence the welfare-mindedness of governments as the theories predict. The results suggest that they do. The most notable findings are these. Political institutions that have a larger number of checks and balances embedded in the decision making process cause more welfare minded governments. The more informed are voters, as measured by literacy and the degree of urbanization, increase the weight governments put on social welfare when making trade policy decisions. Finally, the more ideologically attached are voters to parties and the greater the productivity of the media in influencing voters (uninformed about trade issues), the less weight governments put on social welfare when making trade policy.

These results are, to the best of our knowledge, the first ones that are derived from an underlying theory. We have hinted at others that are potentially testable. Such research can prove important for understanding and advocating policy. If an increase in the welfare-mindedness measure a is the motive for trade liberalization, then the results in the paper suggest that it is in fundamental institutional change that the source of recent liberalization episodes across the world may be found.

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	Table 1.1 : Estimates of a									
	Country	ccode	1/a	se(1/a)	a					
1	Argentina	ARG	0.19	0.02	5.25					
2	Austria	AUS	0.11	0.01	8.79					
3	Bangladesh	BGD	6.34	2.27	0.16					
4	Bolivia	BOL	1.47	0.20	0.68					
5	Brazil	BRA	0.04	0.00	24.91					
6	Chile	CHL	0.21	0.02	4.83					
7	China	CHN	0.12	0.01	8.33					
8	Cameroon	CMR	3.31	2.54	0.30					
9	Colombia	COL	0.13	0.01	7.88					
10	Costa Rica	CRI	0.50	0.07	1.98					
11	Germany	DEU	0.09	0.01	11.55					
12	Denmark	DNK	0.12	0.01	8.10					
13	Ecuador	ECU	0.81	0.14	1.23					
14	Egypt	EGY	0.80	0.18	1.24					
15	Spain	ESP	0.07	0.00	15.16					
16	Ethiopia	ETH	5.92	2.26	0.17					
17	Finland	FIN	0.09	0.01	10.57					
18	France	FRA	0.09	0.01	10.96					
19	U.K.	GBR	0.08	0.01	11.86					
20	Greece	GRC	0.20	0.02	5.11					
21	Guatemala	GTM	0.65	0.08	1.53					
22	Hongkong	HKG	0.00		inf.					
23	Hungary	HUN	0.25	0.02	3.96					
24	Indonesia	IDN	0.38	0.09	2.62					
25	India	IND	0.37	0.05	2.72					
26	Ireland	IRL	0.29	0.04	3.50					
27	Italy	ITA	0.07	0.01	13.42					
28	Japan	JPN	0.03	0.00	37.81					
29	Kenya	KEN	1.16	0.33	0.86					
30	Korea	KOR	0.06	0.00	16.15					
31	Sri Lanka	LKA	1.08	0.18	0.93					
32	Latvia	LVA	0.17	0.01	5.75					
33	Morocco	MAR	0.87	0.14	1.14					
34	Mexico	MEX	0.77	0.07	1.29					
35	Malawi	MWI	3.93	1.17	0.25					
36	Malaysia	MYS	0.32	0.02	3.13					
37	Netherlands	NLD	0.35	0.05	2.85					
38	Norway	NOR	0.24	0.05	4.22					
39	Nepal	NPL	15.56	5.66	0.06					
40	Pakistan	PAK	1.35	0.31	0.74					

			41		
Co	untry	ccode	1/a	se(1/a)	а
41 Per	ru	PER	0.21	0.03	4.85
42 Phi	illipines	PHL	0.35	0.03	2.84
43 Pol	land	POL	0.13	0.01	7.48
44 Ro	mania	ROM	0.11	0.01	9.25
45 Sin	igapore	SGP	0.00	0.00	404.29
46 Sw	reden	SWE	0.08	0.03	12.28
47 Th	ailand	THA	0.94	0.17	1.06
48 Tri	nidad and Tobago	TTO	0.90	0.16	1.11
49 Tu	rkey	TUR	0.07	0.00	14.53
50 Tai	iwan	TWN	0.12	0.01	8.53
51 Ur	uguay	URY	0.28	0.02	3.62
52 Un	ited States	USA	0.04	0.01	26.14
53 Ve	nezuela	VEN	0.18	0.01	5.41
54 <u>So</u>	uth Africa	ZAF	0.19	0.02	5.13
No	tes:				

1. Hong Kong has zero tariffs. In the runs with 54 obs. (full sample) HKG's *a* is set to 10000.

a <1		2 <a≤1< th=""><th></th><th>3<a≤< th=""><th>5</th><th>5<a≤1< th=""><th>0</th><th>10<a< th=""><th></th></a<></th></a≤1<></th></a≤<></th></a≤1<>		3 <a≤< th=""><th>5</th><th>5<a≤1< th=""><th>0</th><th>10<a< th=""><th></th></a<></th></a≤1<></th></a≤<>	5	5 <a≤1< th=""><th>0</th><th>10<a< th=""><th></th></a<></th></a≤1<>	0	10 <a< th=""><th></th></a<>	
Nepal	0.06	Thailand	1.06	Indonesia	2.62	Greece	5.11	Finland	10.57
Bangladesh	0.16	Trinidad and Tobago	1.11	India	2.72	South Africa	5.13	France	10.96
Ethiopia	0.17	Morocco	1.14	Phillipines	2.84	Argentina	5.25	Germany	11.55
Malawi	0.25	Ecuador	1.23	Netherlands	2.85	Venezuela	5.41	U.K.	11.86
Cameroon	0.30	Egypt	1.24	Malaysia	3.13	Latvia	5.75	Sweden	12.28
Bolivia	0.68	Mexico	1.29	Ireland	3.50	Poland	7.48	Italy	13.42
Pakistan	0.74	Guatemala	1.53	Uruguay	3.62	Colombia	7.88	Turkey	14.53
Kenya	0.86	Costa Rica	1.98	Hungary	3.96	Denmark	8.10	Spain	15.16
Sri Lanka	0.93			Norway	4.22	China	8.33	Korea	16.15
				Chile	4.83	Taiwan	8.53	Brazil	24.91
				Peru	4.85	Austria	8.79	United States	26.14
						Romania	9.25	Japan	37.81
								Singapore	404.00
								Hongkong	∞

Table 1.2: Countries ranked by their estimates of a

Source	Variable	Description	Mean	sd	Min	Max
Estimated	$\ln(a)$	log of a	1.313	1.515	-2.813	6.002
WDR	PROPORTIONAL	1 if House seats allocated on a proportional basis; 0 if allocated on plurality (first	-			
		past-the-post winner) basis	0.520	0.505	0	1
WDR	LEGCOHESION	Cohesion among parties in the legislature that form the government = Herfindahl				
		index of # parties in government – Herfindahl index of #parties in opposition	0.232	0.274	-0.554	0.989
WDR	PROP+LEGCOHESION	PROPORTIONAL x LEGCOHESION	0.096	0.218	-0.554	0.572
WDR	PLUR+LEGCOHESION	(1-PROPORTIONAL) x LEGCOHESION	0.137	0.234	-0.036	0.989
WDR	ILLITERACY	% of population with no primary education with less than secondary (xx)				
		school education	0.134	0.183	0	0.630
WDR	URBANIZATION	% of population living in urban area	0.617	0.225	0.111	1
DPI	LRDIVIDE	1 if largest government party in legislature is ideologically different (leftist or				
		rightist) from the largest opposition party. 0 otherwise.	0.360	0.485	0	1
WAT	TVADVERTISING_GDP	Inverse productivity of advertising spending				
		= \$ of Television advertising expenditures per thousand \$ of GDP	2.106	1.608	0.003	6.867
DPI	CHECKS	Executive checks on the legislature	4.000	2.195	1	15
DPI	BinaryCHECKS	Binary measure of executive checks on the legislature: 1 if CHECKS>7,				
		0 otherwise.	0.040	0.198	0	1
DPI	EIEC	Executive index of electoral competitiveness	6.740	1.006	2	7
DPI	BinaryEIEC	Binary measure of executive electoral competitiveness: 1 if EIEC=7, 0 otherwise	0.900	0.303	0	1
DPI	ALLHOUSE	Undivided government: 1 if party of executive has majority in the legislature,				
		0 otherwise	0.460	0.503	0	1
DPI	ESIMILARITY	Ideologically similarity of executive and largest party in government: 1 if both ar	e			
		Leftist, Rightist or Centrist, 0 otherwise	0.800	0.404	0	1

 Table 2: Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics

1. All statistics for 50 countries. Only countires with elected legislatures up to 1996 in the sample. China, Ethiopia, Hong Kong and Taiwan are dropped.

2. DPI refers to Database on Political Institutions (Keefer et al 2001), WDR to various issues of the World Development Report, and WAT to World Advertising Trends (1998).

3. See Section 5.1 for detailed definitions and original sources.

Hypothesis	Variable	OLS1	OLS2	Box-Cox1	Box-Cox2
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROPORTIONAL	0.037	-0.102	0.136	-0.01
		[0.11]	[0.31]	[0.507]	[044]
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROP+LEGCOHESION	1.46	0.99	1.24	0.833
1 1 2		[2.16]**	[1.60]	[2.407]**	[1.793]
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PLUR+LEGCOHESION	1.376	0.338	1.329	0.349
		[1.84]*	[0.49]	[2.318]**	[0.652]
EC: Uninformed voting	ILLITERACY	-2.759	-3.665	-3.098	-3.897
		[2.44]**	[3.37]***	[-3.231]**	[-3.907]
EC: Uninformed voting	URBANIZATION	3.821	3.175	3.365	2.832
		[3.93]***	[3.62]***	[4.263]**	[3.892]
EC: Ideological attachment to party	LRDIVIDE	-0.746	-0.688	-0.65	-0.6
		[2.18]**	[2.19]**	[-2.494]**	[-2.412]
EC: Productivity of media spending	TVADVERTISING_GDP	0.214	0.211	0.155	0.162
		[1.84]*	[1.98]*	[1.755]	[1.895]*
LB: Executive checks on legislators	CHECKS	0.153		0.158	
		[2.10]**		[2.741]**	
LB: Executive checks on legislators	BinaryCHECKS		1.809		1.877
			[2.52]**		[3.098]**
LB: Executive electoral competition	EIEC	-0.368		-0.35	
		[2.58]**		[-3.125]**	
LB: Executive electoral competition	BinaryEIEC		-1.576		-1.364
			[3.75]***		[-3.903]**
LB: Undivided government	ALLHOUSE	-0.296	-0.369	-0.187	-0.263
		[0.86]	[1.27]	[-0.724]	[-1.143]
LB: Undivided government	ESIMILARITY	0.326	0.496	0.193	0.368
		[0.97]	[1.58]	[0.762]	[1.481]
	Constant	0.537	0.68	0.661	0.673
		[0.43]	[0.82]	000	0.50
	θ			099	079
		50	50	[-1.91]*	[-1.49]
		50	50	50	50
	Adjusted <i>R2</i>	0.67	0.72	101.00	1177
	Log likelihood			-121.23	-11/./
	Tests (p-values reported):	0.260	0.001		
	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Hypothesis I} \\ \text{Normality of } \ln(\pi) \end{array}$	0.368	0.901		
	Normality of $In(a)$	0.209	0.209		
	inormality of errors	0.934	0.//9		

Table 3: Hypothesis tests about determinants of aDependent Variable Ln(a)

1. Absolute *t*-statistics in parentheses. * denotes staticial significance at 10%; ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.

2. θ is the Box-Cox transformation parameter: $y = (a^{\theta} - 1)/\theta$.

3. "EC" denotes Electoral Competition theory, "LB" denotes Legislative Bargaining theory.

4. Normality tests report *p* -values for the Shapiro-Wilk test.

Table 4: Beta Coefficients

Theory	Variable	OLS1	OLS2
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROPORTIONAL	0.01	-0.03
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROP+LEGCOHESION	0.21	0.14
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PLUR+LEGCOHESION	0.21	0.05
EC: Uninformed voting	ILLITERACY	-0.33	-0.44
EC: Uninformed voting	URBANIZATION	0.57	0.47
EC: Ideological attachment to party	LRDIVIDE	-0.24	-0.22
EC: Productivity of media spending	TVADVERTISING_GDP	0.23	0.22
LB: Executive checks on legislators	CHECKS	0.22	
LB: Executive checks on legislators	BinaryCHECKS		0.24
LB: Executive electoral competition	EIEC	-0.24	
LB: Executive electoral competition	BinaryEIEC		-0.32
LB: Undivided government	ALLHOUSE	-0.10	-0.12
LB: Undivided government	ESIMILARITY	0.09	0.13

Notes:

1. Beta coefficients are regression coefficients of the standardized dependent variable on standardized explanatory variables.

	M1	M2
PROPORTIONAL	0.052	-0.172
	[0.14]	[0.48]
PROP+LEGCOHESION	1.314	0.968
	[1.83]*	[1.41]
PLUR+LEGCOHESION	1.299	0.375
	[1.63]	[0.49]
ILLITERACY	-3.299	-4.045
	[2.75]***	[3.36]***
URBANIZATION	3.257	3.182
	[3.15]***	[3.28]***
LRDIVIDE	-0.656	-0.689
	[1.81]*	[1.98]*
TVADVERTISING_GDP	0.17	0.19
	[1.38]	[1.61]
CHECKS	0.152	
	[1.96]*	
BinaryCHECKS		1.927
		[2.43]**
EIEC	-0.328	
	[2.17]**	
BinaryEIEC		-1.534
		[3.30]***
ALLHOUSE	-0.276	-0.28
	[0.76]	[0.87]
ESIMILARITY	0.228	0.503
	[0.64]	[1.45]
Constant	0.788	0.706
	[0.59]	[0.77]
N	50	50
Adjusted <i>R2</i>	0.69	0.75

Table 5: Robust (to Outliers) regressionsDependent variable: ln(a)

1. Absolute *t* -statistics in parentheses:

* denotes staticial significance at 10%; ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.

2. Weighted regressions, with weights inversely related to residuals.

	r + without			
	0	LS	Weight	ed OLS
	M1	M2	M1	M2
PROPORTIONAL	0.037	-0.102	-0.01	-0.032
	[0.11]	[0.31]	[0.03]	[0.11]
PROP+LEGCOHESION	1.46	0.99	0.941	0.522
	[2.16]**	[1.60]	[1.47]	[1.01]
PLUR+LEGCOHESION	1.376	0.338	1.448	1.039
	[1.84]*	[0.49]	[1.39]	[1.21]
ILLITERACY	-2.759	-3.665	1.903	1.824
	[2.44]**	[3.37]***	[1.24]	[1.39]
URBANIZATION	3.821	3.175	2.961	1.619
	[3.93]***	[3.62]***	[2.45]**	[1.57]
LRDIVIDE	-0.746	-0.688	-0.418	-0.38
	[2.18]**	[2.19]**	[1.57]	[1.89]*
TVADVERTISING_GDP	0.214	0.211	0.183	0.229
	[1.84]*	[1.98]*	[1.93]*	[3.00]***
CHECKS	0.153		-0.015	
	[2.10]**		[0.17]	
BinaryCHECKS		1.809		-1.457
		[2.52]**		[0.98]
EIEC	-0.368		-0.86	
	[2.58]**		[2.66]**	
BinaryEIEC		-1.576		-2.128
		[3.75]***		[5.38]***
ALLHOUSE	-0.296	-0.369	-0.651	-0.708
	[0.86]	[1.27]	[2.58]**	[3.52]***
ESIMILARITY	0.326	0.496	0.928	1.072
	[0.97]	[1.58]	[2.75]***	[3.92]***
Constant	0.537	0.68	5.04	1.887
	[0.43]	OLS Weighted OL M1 M2 M1 N 0.037 -0.102 -0.01 -0 $[0.11]$ $[0.31]$ $[0.03]$ $[0$ 1.46 0.99 0.941 $0.$ $[2.16]^{**}$ $[1.60]$ $[1.47]$ $[1$ 1.376 0.338 1.448 $1.$ $[1.84]^*$ $[0.49]$ $[1.39]$ $[1$ -2.759 -3.665 1.903 $1.$ $[2.44]^{**}$ $[3.37]^{***}$ $[1.24]$ $[1$ 3.821 3.175 2.961 $1.$ $[3.93]^{***}$ $[3.62]^{***}$ $[2.45]^{**}$ $[1$ -0.746 -0.688 -0.418 -0.68 $[2.18]^{**}$ $[2.19]^{**}$ $[1.57]$ $[1.$ 0.214 0.211 0.183 $0.$ $[1.84]^*$ $[1.98]^*$ $[1.93]^*$ $[3.0$ 0.153 -0.656 -22 $[3.75]^{***}$ $[0.17]$ <t< td=""><td>[2.14]**</td></t<>	[2.14]**	
N	50	50	50	50
Adjusted R2	0.67	0.72	0.53	0.69

Table 6: Weighted regressions Dependent variable: $\ln(a)$

1. Absolute *t*-statistics in parentheses:

* denotes staticial significance at 10%; ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.

2. First two columns are OLS estimates from Table 3.

3. Weighted OLS estimates use invese of the variance of ln(a) as weights.

TYPE A Robustness TYPE B Robustness							
Variable	Robust bounds exist?	Est	timates	<i>t</i> -value	Influential regressors	ROBUST?	
PROPORTIONAL	NO	high	-0.173	0.445	ILLITERACY	No	
		base	0.037	0.110			
		low	0.634	1.068			
ILLITERACY	YES	high	-1.963	-1.647	none	Robust	
	All combinations	base	-2.759	2.440			
		low	-6.962	-6.296			
URBANIZATION	YES	high	6.311	8.555	none	Robust	
	All combinations	base	3.821	3.930			
		low	2.692	2.899			
LRDIVIDE	YES	high	0.435	0.811	ILLITERACY,	Robust	
	3 or 4 variable combos	base	-0.746	2.180	URBANIZATION		
		low	-0.818	-2.155			
TVADVERTISING_GDP	YES	high	0.685	6.164	none	Robust	
	All combinations	base	0.214	1.840			
		low	0.204	1.646			
CHECKS	YES	high	0.176	2.696	ILLITERACY,	No	
	3 or 4 variable combos	base	0.153	2.100	URBANIZATION		
		low	-0.092	-0.763			
BinaryCHECKS	YES	high	2.152	2.468		No	
	2, 3 or 4 variable combos	base	1.809	2.520	TVADVERTISING_GDP		
		low	-0.971	-0.766			
EIEC	YES	high	0.037	0.153	ILLITERACY,	No	
	2, 3 or 4 variable combos	base	-0.368	2.580	URBANIZATION,		
		low	-0.374	-2.335	TVADVERTISING_GDP		
BinaryEIEC	YES	high	-0.856	-1.098		Robust, but	
	All combinations	base	-1.576	3.750		weakly	
		low	-1.767	-3.287			
ALLHOUSE	NO	high	0.074	0.195	ILLITERACY,	No	
		base	-0.296	0.860	URBANIZATION		
		low	-0.650	-1.162			
ESIMILARITY	NO	high	0.537	1.496	ILLITERACY,	No	
		base	0.326	0.970	TVADVERTISING_GDP		
		low	-0.176	-0.462			

 Table 7: SensitivityAnalysis: Extreme Bounds

1. The base estimates are from the first column of OLS estimates (BEIEC and BCHECKS from the second) of Table 3.

2. The "high" and "low" values are estimated as the max and min of the set of estimates using all possible combinations of 1, 2, 3, and 4 regressors (= 212 runs).

3. TYPE A Robustness indicates intervals (with 1,2,3, or 4 regressors, respectively) not containing zero, with both bounds statistically significant at 10%.

4. TYPE B Robustness indicates the presence or absence of robust intervals across the (212) sets of estimates for any issue variable.

Table 8: Determinants of Rawlsian estimates of a							
Dependent Variable:							
Hypothesis	Variable	ln(a	r ^{R1})	ln(a	a ^{R2})	$\ln(a^{R3})$	
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROPORTIONAL	-0.026	-0.034	0.247	0.268	-0.036	-0.052
		[0.07]	[0.09]	[0.51]	[0.55]	[0.09]	[0.13]
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROP+LEGCOHESION	0.834	0.798	1.449	1.506	0.719	0.671
		[1.07]	[1.07]	[1.51]	[1.61]	[0.91]	[0.89]
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PLUR+LEGCOHESION	-0.345	-0.439	-0.454	-0.457	-0.346	-0.47
		[0.39]	[0.51]	[0.42]	[0.43]	[0.39]	[0.54]
EC: Uninformed voting	ILLITERACY	0.872	0.36	2.332	2.035	0.945	0.358
		[0.64]	[0.26]	[1.44]	[1.21]	[0.69]	[0.25]
EC: Uninformed voting	URBANIZATION	2.705	2.511	3.052	3.039	2.684	2.442
		[2.50]**	[2.35]**	[2.30]**	[2.28]**	[2.45]**	[2.26]**
EC: Ideological attachment to party	LRDIVIDE	-0.986	-0.933	-0.91	-0.884	-1.025	-0.965
		[2.54]**	[2.44]**	[1.93]*	[1.86]*	[2.60]**	[2.49]**
EC: Productivity of media spending	TVADVERTISING_GDP	0.273	0.274	0.365	0.363	0.284	0.285
		[2.09]**	[2.14]**	[2.32]**	[2.32]**	[2.15]**	[2.21]**
LB: Executive checks on legislators	CHECKS	0.03		-0.031		0.038	
		[0.35]		[0.30]		[0.44]	
LB: Executive checks on legislators	BinaryCHECKS		1.162		0.557		1.281
			[1.11]		[0.43]		[1.21]
LB: Executive electoral competition	EIEC	-0.023		0		-0.031	
		[0.14]		[0.00]		[0.19]	
LB: Executive electoral competition	BinaryEIEC		-0.357		-0.242		-0.435
			[0.62]		[0.34]		[0.75]
LB: Undivided government	ALLHOUSE	-0.435	-0.425	-0.637	-0.547	-0.394	-0.395
		[1.13]	[1.23]	[1.35]	[1.27]	[1.01]	[1.13]
LB: Undivided government	ESIMILARITY	0.723	0.702	0.896	0.859	0.731	0.711
		[1.71]*	[1.70]*	[1.73]*	[1.67]	[1.71]*	[1.71]*
	Constant	-1.383	-0.925	-2.013	-1.912	-1.4	-0.847
		[0.95]	[0.79]	[1.14]	[1.33]	[0.95]	[0.72]
	N	47	47	48	48	47	47
	Adjusted <i>R2</i>	0.3368	0.36	0.31	0.31	0.33	0.36

1. Absolute *t*-statistics in parentheses. * denotes staticial significance at 10%; ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.

2. a^{R1} , $a^{R2}a^{R3}$ are ,respectively, estimates of a from different Rawlsian specifications (15). See Table A1.

Table A1: Estimates of a with Rawlsian variables added

14	ole mi. Estimat		ita misiani va	nuoles udded	
country	ccode	а	a^{R1}	a^{R2}	a^{R3}
argentina	ARG	5.25	7.15	5.87	7.15
australia	AUS	8.79	2.98	3.04	2.99
bangladesh	BGD	0.16	0.38	0.35	0.38
bolivia	BOL	0.68	0.35	0.29	0.34
brazil	BRA	24.91		377.07	
chile	CHL	4.83	3.65	4.38	3.52
cameroon	CMR	0.3	0.75	0.6	0.74
colombia	COL	7.88	9.79	21.06	9.59
costa	CRI	1.98	3.72	10.69	4.13
germany	DEU	11.55	10.88	9.61	10.85
denmark	DNK	8.1	2.98	2.84	2.69
ecuador	ECU	1.23	0.63	0.63	0.64
egypt,	EGY	1.24	0.75	0.87	0.77
spain	ESP	15.16	16.04	25.18	15.71
finland	FIN	10.57	3.66	3.91	3.04
france	FRA	10.96	3.77	3.4	3.78
UK	GBR	11.86	5.3	4.45	5.01
greece	GRC	5.11	3.58	3.92	3.53
guatemala	GTM	1.53	1.49	1.32	1.5
hungary	HUN	3.96	2.8	3.03	2.49
indonesia	IDN	2.62	1.5	1.61	1.53
india	IND	2.72	4.07	2.74	4.52
ireland	IRL	3.5	1.72	2.18	1.75
italy	ITA	13.42	12.07	11.67	12.08
japan	JPN	37.81	13.89	12.77	13.46
kenya	KEN	0.86	0.5	0.51	0.5
korea,	KOR	16.15	11.78	12.47	13
srilanka	LKA	0.93	0.58	0.65	0.58
latvia	LVA	5.75	5.7	4.09	5.71
morocco	MAR	1.14	1	1.31	1.02
mexico	MEX	1.29	0.64	0.67	0.58
malawi	MWI	0.25	0.89	0.75	0.89
malaysia	MYS	3.13	2.38	2.56	2.64
netherlands	NLD	2.85	0.68	0.62	0.67
norway	NOR	4.22	0.94	0.97	0.7
nepal	NPL	0.06	4.8	4.28	4.8
pakistan	PAK	0.74			
peru	PER	4.85	3.47	14.6	3.47
philippines	PHL	2.84	2.31	2.37	2.31
poland	POL	7.48	8.45	8.3	7.62
romania	ROM	9.25			-6.62
singapore	SGP	404.29	65.53	55.35	83.64
sweden	SWE	12.28	12.12	15.69	7.12
thailand	THA	1.06	0.67	0.69	0.69
trinidad	TTO	1.11	0.6	0.59	0.6
turkey	TUR	14.53	9.58	10.16	9.74
uruguay	URY	3.62	3.17	2.92	3.15
US	USA	26.14	7.2	6.5	6.25
venezuela	VEN	5.41	3.66	3.83	3.62
S.Africa	ZAF	5.13	3.14	3.61	2.89

1. First column of estimates are the *a*'s from Table 1.1.

2. aR1 denotes estimates of a from Rawlsian specification (15): wage as additional regressor.

aR2 is estimated a from Rawlsian specification (15): labor productivity plus wages wage as regressors. aR3 is estimated a from Rawlsian specification (15): wages/per capita income as additional regressors.

3. Missing estimates if regressor data unavailable or a estimated to be negative.

		Ι	Dependent	variable			
Hypothesis	Variable	ln	(<i>a</i>)	tai	riff	ln[<i>te</i>	ariff)
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROPORTIONAL	0.037	-0.102	1.156	0.44	0.253	0.276
		[0.11]	[0.31]	[0.45]	[0.18]	[0.76]	[0.88]
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PROP+LEGCOHESION	1.46	0.99	1.188	-0.718	-0.374	-0.306
		[2.16]**	[1.60]	[0.24]	[0.15]	[0.59]	[0.51]
EC: Proportonal versus plurality	PLUR+LEGCOHESION	1.376	0.338	2.167	-1.635	-0.316	-0.134
		[1.84]*	[0.49]	[0.40]	[0.31]	[0.45]	[0.20]
EC: Uninformed voting	ILLITERACY	-2.759	-3.665	34.012	26.531	1.352	1.387
		[2.44]**	[3.37]***	[4.18]***	[3.23]***	[1.28]	[1.33]
EC: Uninformed voting	URBANIZATION	3.821	3.175	-5.015	-8.993	-1.689	-1.649
		[3.93]***	[3.62]***	[0.72]	[1.36]	[1.86]*	[1.96]*
EC: Ideological attachment to party	LRDIVIDE	-0.746	-0.688	0.292	1.315	0.215	0.268
		[2.18]**	[2.19]**	[0.12]	[0.55]	[0.67]	[0.89]
EC: Productivity of media spending	TVADVERTISING_GDP	0.214	0.211	0.025	-0.004	-0.053	-0.056
		[1.84]*	[1.98]*	[0.03]	[0.01]	[0.49]	[0.55]
LB: Executive checks on legislators	CHECKS	0.153		1.599		0.052	
		[2.10]**		[3.04]***		[0.76]	
LB: Executive checks on legislators	BinaryCHECKS		1.809		19.12		0.514
			[2.52]**		[3.54]***		[0.75]
LB: Executive electoral competition	EIEC	-0.368		-0.696		0.069	
		[2.58]**		[0.68]		[0.52]	
LB: Executive electoral competition	BinaryEIEC		-1.576		-0.032		0.83
			[3.75]***		[0.01]		[2.05]**
LB: Undivided government	ALLHOUSE	-0.296	-0.369	3.865	3.214	0.318	0.325
		[0.86]	[1.27]	[1.56]	[1.46]	[0.99]	[1.16]
LB: Undivided government	ESIMILARITY	0.326	0.496	-2.732	-2.07	-0.345	-0.407
		[0.97]	[1.58]	[1.13]	[0.88]	[1.11]	[1.35]
	Constant	0.537	0.68	9.089	14.057	2.568	2.434
		[0.43]	[0.82]	[1.00]	[2.24]**	[2.18]**	[3.05]***
	Ν	50	50	50	50	50	50
	Adjusted R2	0.67	0.72	0.62	0.64	0.26	0.33

 Table A2: Determinants of Tariffs

1. Absolute *t*-statistics in parentheses. * denotes staticial significance at 10%; ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.

2. The tariff for a country is its import-weighted average.